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Abstract
Dell is a well-known consumer electronics manufacturer that has experienced astounding rates of
revenue growth since its inception in 1984. Regarded as a supply chain innovator, Dell has
attained success through industry-revolutionizing ideas such as vendor-managed inventory, pull
manufacturing, and direct sales. Today, continuance of revenue growth for Dell requires not only
rapid innovation, but also rapid geographic and product expansion.
Until a few years ago, Dell only had one facility in the United States. All of Dell's US-based
systems and processes were constructed to optimize this single factory. Since 1999, Dell has
added a number of new facilities in the US - factories and merge centers - for the sake of
proximity to customers as well as additional capacity. Also, Dell recently began practicing more
product leveling than in the past, producing multiple types of systems at the same factory.
Finally, Dell's US supply base has migrated to Asia, as have those of most in the industry. This
confluence of complexities has led to a significant increase in instances of material imbalances,
whereby any given part has not been distributed to the various sites in accordance with their
proportion of actual demand, often resulting in costly expedites from site to site or delayed
shipments to customers.
Part of the solution to this problem is what Dell has termed "Dynamic Replenishment". As Dell's
US supply has shifted from America-based to Asia-based over the past five years, the effective
lead time for most ocean-shipped parts has increased from days to several weeks. As a result, the
site-level forecast for routing of an ocean shipment is more frequently incorrect by the time it
reaches the US, and material imbalances occur. In order to reduce these imbalances, Dynamic
Replenishment processes aim to proactively re-route material (if needed, based on campus
inventories and forecasts) upon arrival at the US port. This thesis will focus on the tools,
information, processes, and organizational roles that are required to ensure proper routing of
material at the latest possible juncture in Dell's ocean-network supply chain. Treatment will also
be given to the idea that the material balancing problem is one of many that result from Dell's
rapid supply chain growth, and some related issues will be examined from this broader
perspective. (A note on scope: The content of this thesis is related only to Dell's US-based
operations. All history, facts, and comments should be taken in this regard.)
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1 Dell and Industry Overview
1.1 Dell's Early Success
The story of Dell's beginning is a reasonably common one. It is the story of a driven man with
superb market timing. The story of Dell's survival, however, is not so simple; it is nothing short
of a tale of revolution in business and supply chains. Dell's past and its pinnacles of success have
defined not only what the company is today, but what the industry is as well. Therefore, I offer a
requisite brief history of the company and a summary of its defining strategies.
Before Dell emerged, IBM was the only major PC producer, and consumers were so under-
informed that profit margins could be as high as 80% (8). Post-sale service was non-existent and
not considered an important element of a computer sale. Suppliers of key components such as
processors and operating systems were still working to develop mature products and to find a
market large enough to establish the power that they knew they could someday obtain. In this
ripe atmosphere Michael Dell started his PC company out of a college dorm room, and moved
within one year to a 30,000 sq. foot building to support the booming business (8).
It would not be long before the environment became more challenging. Many saw the
opportunity that Dell did, and names such as Compaq, Gateway, and Macintosh joined
America's household vocabulary along with IBM and Dell. In addition, IBM's unintended gift of
sizeable market power to Intel and Microsoft further complicated the position of computer
manufacturers. It became a game of survival for these companies, but Michael Dell did not want
to survive. He wanted to win. He accomplished this through one revolutionary idea and
remarkable follow-through on the success it fostered.
That revolutionary idea is one that may not sound so revolutionary today: Listen to the customer.
Throughout the birth of the personal computing industry, there was a pervasive attitude that
computer engineers should determine what customers need and they will purchase it; a "build it
and they will come" type of strategy. Dell realized, in part because he did not have the capital to
invest in anything the customer didn't want, that "it always made more sense [...] to build a
business based on what people really wanted, rather than guess at what we thought they might
want" (8). This marked the beginning of a practice that is widely copied in business today and a
phrase that has become commonplace in the business world: The Direct Model.
Dell's "Direct Model" is often regarded as its explicit use of the internet to sell directly to
customers, but it is much more than that. Application of a direct model only begins with selling
directly to customers. It is made complete by retaining immediate knowledge of those direct
sales and using it to design a better product, understand future needs of the customer, customize
sales to specific types of customers, and to establish a more informed supply chain, among other
practices. While competitors could only guess at what was being sold through their retailers, Dell
was reacting immediately to shifts in customer needs and communicating customer demand
throughout their supply chain with little or no delay. This is the advantage that initially drove
Dell to the top, but the company has devised a number of innovative strategies in addition to this
one in order to stay on top and continue climbing.
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1.2 DelI's Strategies
Dell's primary strategies are clearly outlined in a diagram available through its public website
(1):
/
Beginning with the customer.
Ending with the customer.
DOL
Figure 1. The Dell Direct Model (1).
The foundations of this model are direct relationships with their customers and maintaining a
positive customer experience once those relationships are established. They achieve this through
strategies such as build-to-order manufacturing, low costs, customization, and clear and simple
service, among others. The company has been highly successful with these strategies for the past
20 years, but the past year has introduced difficulty in maintaining the sky-high growth levels
with which Dell's investors have become so enamored.
Dell announced recently that its next major goal is to achieve $80 billion in revenues in
approximately three years (6). This will be no small feat. At first glance, a jump to $80 billion in
three years appears to be in line with historical revenue trends (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Dell historical and projected revenue. (10)
However, one must take a glance at the current list of $80+ billion companies to understand what
it takes to reach this goal. First, take note that in 2005, out of 2000 companies reviewed by
Forbes, only 25 have revenues at or above $80 billion, with the numbers tapering sharply above
$55 billion (see Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Distribution of companies at incremental annual revenue levels. (11)
Also, most of these companies are either based in the consumer durables, oil & gas, or insurance
markets, or are large conglomerates, in total accounting for 72% of all companies with revenue
above $80 billion in Forbes' study (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4. Number of Forbes 2000 companies, by industry, with revenues above $80 billion. (11)
Although we see that two technology companies have ventured into the $80 billion+ realm, this
accounts for only 8% of all companies which have accomplished the same. The point: it is not
common or easy for a technology company to achieve the scale and product portfolio needed to
bring in $80 billion in annual revenues. Dell is well aware of this, and is tackling the challenge
on multiple fronts.
Steps to drive toward the $80 billion goal range from global expansion to a widening of the
product portfolio. Dell's primary markets now include the US, Europe, Asia, and Latin America,
while their product portfolio has expanded from just PCs to servers, storage, workstations,
networking, notebooks, PCs, printers, software, and various related services (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Dell product and geographic expansion. (9)
Dell's $80 billion mission and related strategies are driven by a low-margin industry that
demands ever-increasing market share for survival. Following is a brief review of the PC and
consumer electronics industry and some of Dell's most prominent competition.
1.3 Industry Overview
In the beginning, sometime around the early 1980's, all a computer manufacturing company had
to do to succeed was keep costs down and install the next generation microprocessor before the
competitors did. Processing power was the limiting factor to virtually all computational
functions, and customers were hungry for more. In addition, focus was primarily on the US
market, as most customers were still located in this region and it was also the region that led
adoption of newer technologies (especially because most of those technologies were developed
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in the US). Strategies for success were clear and a plethora of competitors soon entered the
market.
IBM was the first major entrant to the consumer PC market. It was highly successful during its
early years as customers discovered the potential of the PC. However, the success did not last
long as Intel and Microsoft eventually narrowed IBM's margins through their increased control
of the most critical computer components. The computer market quickly shifted from a strategy
of vertical integration and high technology to one of outsourcing and low cost. As this transition
occurred, competitors such as Dell, HP, and Compaq entered the market. The mid-eighties
through early nineties would be a challenging time for these manufacturers as they fought for
market share amidst intense price competition.
Today, each competitor in the PC market has devised a particular strategy to help it succeed in
this somewhat unappealing market. For example, IBM established a key focus on large
customers and providing comprehensive service to those customers throughout the lifetime of
their products. IBM has gone as far as to establish an all-out consulting division for its large
customers, and has sold its consumer PC business to Lenovo in order to focus on such endeavors.
Hewlett-Packard's strategies involve heavy investment in research of new technologies and
expansion into computer-related markets, such as printing.
What can be said about the strategies of all companies in this industry is that every one must take
into account a rapidly evolving industry as well as one that is expanding globally at staggering
rates. Nearly every company that at one time focused on PC manufacturing is now dabbling in
associated electronics such as printers, handhelds, and even televisions. In addition, extended
services have become a non-negotiable element of computer and related sales. Geographically,
there is a dynamic battle playing out for markets such as China, Latin America, and Europe.
Most of these markets are not yet mature and the struggle for new market share in a low-margin,
relationship-based industry is intense. Finally, supply bases for computer manufacturers have
dispersed themselves around the globe as suppliers are forced to seek lower labor rates in a low-
cost industry.
Challenges such as these have wreaked havoc on the businesses and supply chains of today's key
industry players, which include Dell (18% world market share of PC shipments), HP (16%),
Lenovo (6%), Acer (5%), and Fujitsu/Siemens (4%) (7). SKU count is exploding as new
products are introduced and people, IT systems, and suppliers struggle to keep up.
Communications are becoming more and more difficult as organizations expand globally and
frequent re-organizations are required to keep up with evolving markets. Supply lead times have
jumped from days to weeks as suppliers move to various countries throughout Asia. These issues
have presented major hurdles for Dell, in particular, due to their high-volume make-to-order
business.
Following is a review of the evolution of Dell's supply chain and a study of how these
challenges affect Dell's supply chain today.
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2. The Dell Supply Chain
2.1 World-Class Supply Chain Design
In 1984, Dell's supply chain consisted of a dorm room at UT Austin and a few nearby
component suppliers. Ten years later, Dell was bringing in nearly $3 billion in annual revenues.
One might speculate, then, that Dell's supply chain must have evolved in significant ways to
accommodate this growth, but in many ways the supply chain in 1994 was nearly identical to
that of 1984. While it had expanded to new suppliers, new customers, and new products, the
essential design remained the same. In the US, Dell manufactured in one location: Austin, Texas.
It manufactured all products there and shipped to all customers from there, and many suppliers
were still located in nearby Texas cities.
Dell's supply chain was run in this manner for many years, until the early 1990's when key
changes began to evolve in the supply chain framework that Dell had built. One key change
began with the team that managed Dell's hard drive supply. This team worked with a number of
suppliers who had established a network of third-party warehouses throughout Austin to
accommodate Dell's ramping production. The buyers on the hard drive team established a daily
protocol of calling the warehouses, documenting each one's level of inventory, and issuing
"picks" from particular warehouses as needed. This simple procedure eventually became Dell's
renowned policy of utilizing what they call "SLCs", or "Supplier Logistics Centers". In light of
this success, more and more suppliers were asked to place their inventories in third-party
warehouses and convey inventory levels to Dell on a regular basis so that inventory could be
well-managed.
A large part of the reason that Dell was able to accomplish such improvements was because it
had become such a large percentage of its suppliers' business. As Dell grew extremely rapidly
throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's, it maintained a supplier base near its facility in
Austin, Texas. These smaller local suppliers faced the nearly inevitable fate that they would
become largely dependent on Dell's booming business (with the exception of larger suppliers
such as Intel and Microsoft). As Dell's buyer power grew, it keenly recognized the potential to
leverage that power in order to establish a supply chain advantage and maximize cash flows.
During that time (primarily throughout the 1990's), Dell implemented a number of new
initiatives that established supply chain design as a key strategic advantage for the company. The
following is a summary of the most well-known supply chain strategies that Dell has very
successfully developed and employed since that time.
SLCs (Supplier Logistics Centers): The majority of Dell's vendors are required to store
an agreed-upon amount of inventory in third-party logistics centers that are generally
located within walking distance of the factories they supply.
VMI (Vendor-Managed Inventory): This element has two essential components. The first
is the fact that a supplier is considered to be responsible for understanding Dell's
forecasted demand at all locations and maintaining a set level of buffer stock (in the
SLCs) in order to meet that demand at a given service level. Dell communicates this
forecast on a weekly basis and suppliers are expected to accordingly modify production
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and shipment schedules without specific direction from Dell. The second component of
VMI is the idea that a supplier owns its inventory until it is inside Dell'sfactory. This is
critical, as it removes a major portion of Dell's inventory from its books, and also
eliminates a significant portion of Dell's obsolescence risk, which is a major concern in
the consumer electronics industry.
Pull Manufacturing: Dell's "Direct Model" allows it to track customer demand to the
hour, which enables it to maintain only exactly the supply it needs, at any given time, in
its factories for production. Dell takes advantage of this by adhering to a strict pull
manufacturing system, whereby supply is pulled from the SLCs every two hours in
quantities that are just enough to satisfy demand for those two hours (See Figure 6). This
minimizes inventory levels, streamlines production, and forces more accurate accounting
of supply. In recent industry terms, it makes Dell's factory "lean".
"Push" "Pull"
Buy-to-Plan --- + +-- Build-to-Order
Material requested to build customer orders
E
All material is tied to a customer order -
nothing is built without an order.
Figure 6. Dell's pull system of manufacturing (9).
Cash Conversion Cycle Management: Dell's amazing negative 36-day cash cycle is one
aspect of their supply chain that is not always discussed in tales of their excellence, but it
is a critical component of their success. Most computer manufacturers pay suppliers about
30 days before a computer is shipped, bought by a customer, and paid for by that
customer (3). Dell, on the other hand, collects customer payment immediately through
internet sales, and does not disburse cash for supplies for those purchases until a few
hours before the computer is made and shipped (due to VMI and pull production
policies). As a result, Dell's customers and suppliers essentially finance its operations.
The combination of these and other elements has placed Dell on a veritable throne over the
kingdom of supply chain design. Whereas twelve years ago Dell maintained 20 to 25 days of
inventory in a network of warehouses, today it has no warehouses and only two hours of
inventory in its factories. It accomplishes all of this while continuing to produce more than
80,000 computers each day. It must be noted, however, that Dell's supply chain faces many of
the same challenges as its competitors in spite of its ingenious design. Ever more demanding
consumers have driven the expansion of both manufacturing locations as well as product
portfolio. An unforgiving low-margin industry has forced Dell's supply base to move to the other
side of the world in search of lower labor costs. Demands such as these have intensified at
staggering rates over the past five years, driving geographic and product-based evolutions for
Dell that push even the limits of its superior supply chain.
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2.2 Dell's Supply Chain in the 2000's: Evolution and Expansion
In reviewing Dell's supply chain history, one might say that 1998 marked the beginning of a
major supply chain transition that took place on multiple fronts.
SLC Implementation
First, 1999 brought the introduction of a full-blown SLC strategy. Third party logistics providers
and warehouses were consolidated and suppliers were now required to use the SLCs that Dell
had arranged. The SLC and VMI policies became more explicit, and processes and IT systems
evolved to accommodate this.
Addition of Nashville and North Carolina Facilities
In 2000, Dell realized it needed more capacity and questioned whether that capacity should be
located in Austin. A strong argument was made for the benefits of collocation with Dell's
customer base in the East (faster delivery times, hence improved customer service), and for
reduced outbound logistics cost as an additional benefit. Consequently, a new factory was
constructed in Nashville, Tennessee, originally chartered to build only consumer PCs, while
Austin would continue to manufacture PCs, workstations, and servers. More recently, a new
factory in Winston-Salem, North Carolina was also constructed.
"GeoManufacturing"
As Dell's logistics and manufacturing teams continued to seek further cost reductions, they came
to the realization that they could achieve higher capacity utilizations, mitigate risk, and further
reduce distance to the customer by implementing a product leveling strategy across their two
factories. A policy called "GeoManufacturing" was implemented whereby both factories would
produce PCs and Workstations, with quantities determined by an anticipated distribution of
customer locations (called a "Geo Split").
Introduction of Merge Centers
In an effort to continue optimizing their geographic footprint, improve customer service, and
better focus the resources of their manufacturing facilities, Dell began to introduce "merge
centers". These merge centers would either merge a system (PC, workstation, or server) with its
corresponding monitor, software, and peripherals, or merge a bundle of non-system items (eg. an
order for a mouse and a keyboard) before shipment to the customer. The addition of this step in
Dell's process allowed them to 1) further reduce distance to the customer, 2) eliminate a portion
of inbound logistics costs by locating merge centers closer to ports on the West Coast, 3) allow
factories to focus on manufacturing and leave packaging operations to others, and 4) improve
customer service by packaging items together for one single delivery. Over time, merge centers
were introduced in Nevada, Ohio, Texas, and Tennessee.
Migration of US Supply Base to Asia
The migration of a US supply base to primarily Asian countries is not a challenge that Dell faced
alone. Most consumer electronics manufacturers have had to deal with this issue in the past five
to ten years. This migration took place at an astounding pace as suppliers fought to stay alive in
commodity electronics markets. The following chart depicts the pace at which the US supply
base for a key component, chassis, migrated from the US to Asia for Dell.
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Expanding Product Portfolio and Complexity
In efforts to reach its $80 billion goal, Dell has introduced a slew of new products to its portfolio,
and has added new levels of complexity to these products. An online customer of Dell would
have, five years ago, most likely logged on to find a focused advertisement of the latest, most
powerful PC or notebook available. Today, however, that customer will be inundated with ads
for a PC, the latest flat-screen televisions, and a high-resolution monitor, with options to explore
MP3 players, handhelds, printers, and gaming systems (see Figure 8). These additions represent
Dell's effort to fully leverage its competitive advantages in marketing, supply chain, and other
areas to achieve maximum market share.
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Figure 8. Dell's product expansion from 1998 to 2005. (9)
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It is important to keep in mind that the changes discussed above have taken place, for the most
part, in only five years. Dell, as always, has done an amazing job of keeping up with these
changes and continuing to hand in ever-higher revenue report cards to Wall Street. However,
there are some undeniable complications that have arisen in Dell's supply chain as a result of
these changes, and the challenges must be faced head-on if Dell is to remain competitive. A
review of some of these challenges is offered in the following section, particularly those that
essentially drove the need for the analysis and improvements to be reviewed in this document.
2.3 Today's Supply Chain Challenges
Having reviewed six major supply chain transitions in the previous sections, one might expect to
see a broad discussion of varied impacts that they have on Dell's supply chain. I assert, however,
that a significant portion of the impact of these transitions can be summarized in only two
challenges for Dell's supply chain (without respect to organizational challenges to be addressed
in a later section). Those challenges are an increase in supply lead time and the disaggregation of
supply andforecasts. The following offers a brief review of the impacts of these effects on a
supply chain.
Inventory and Service Levels
All conclusions in this section are derived from the relationships between lead times, demand
variation, and inventory levels. The following defined relationship will look familiar to those
with the most basic of operations backgrounds:
s = XL +kaL (Formula 1),
where s is a reorder point, xL is the amount of stock necessary to supply average demand for the
duration of the supply lead time, k is a factor based on the desired service level, and (TL is the
variation of demand over the supply lead time.
We can say, given this relationship, that
1) when lead time increases, either inventory levels must increase to maintain the same
service level or the service level must decrease and
2) the same is true for an increase in demand variation.
Each supply chain challenge that Dell faces, as outlined above, can be categorized as causing one
of these two effects.
1) Increases in Supply Lead Time
The migration of Dell's US supply base to Asia is listed above as one of six major supply chain
transitions, but it deserves recognition as possibly the most challenging obstacle to overcome in
the next decade. This is no minor increase in lead times. Dell has gone from what were lead
times measured in days for local suppliers to lead times measured in weeks (typically four to six
weeks) for those in Asia. For unconstrained parts (those whose collective industry supply
exceeds collective demand), this means a need for significantly higher inventory levels. For parts
that are industry constrained, this can mean severe shortages in supply.
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2) Disaggregation of Demand
It is documented that, as demand is disaggregated, its overall variation increases. Specifically,
the amount of inventory required to maintain the same service level (as in the case of no
disaggregation) increases at a rate equal to the square root of the number of "divisions" in
demand that are introduced, given certain basic assumptions. The disaggregation of demand can
occur in multiple ways. For Dell, as mentioned previously, it has occurred on two primary fronts.
First, each new factory, although addressing some new portion of new demand, disaggregates
current demand for desktop orders geographically. It is important to note, in this case, that the
significance of the effect that this geographic disaggregation has on Dell is dependent upon at
what point in the supply chain supply is routed to a particular location. If supply could be routed
to a single location, and only dispersed to each factory at the last minute, the effects of
geographic disaggregation would be minimal as there would exist little time for demand variance
to have a large effect. However, if there is a lag between the disaggregation (or routing to a
particular location) and actual customer purchase, then significant levels of variance in demand
are likely to occur and higher inventory levels must be maintained in order to meet the same
service levels. The second type of disaggregation that Dell faces is the policy of
GeoManufacturing, which disaggregates products (specifically desktops and workstations). The
demand pooling effects accomplished by serving one type of product out of one single location
are lost as product production is dispersed across multiple factories. In addition, product demand
disaggregation is amplified by Dell's addition of new products to its portfolio. This spreads
demand over more products (most likely with less demand per product), resulting in less
predictable product demand levels.
Dell and many other industries are already seeing the effects of the challenges of increased lead
times and demand disaggregation. A recent Annual State of Logistics Report (published by the
Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals) stated that "As global supply chains have
become longer and less predictable, companies have been carrying higher-than-ideal levels of
inventory... prudent managers want to minimize inventory, but if they do that, they could be left
with empty shelves." (5) Many speculations exist regarding Dell, specifically, as well. Logistics
magazine states that Dell increased its days of inventory from three to four in FY 2005, and
comments that "it may signal that the logistics icon is stretching its supply chain as it grows
across product lines and geographic borders." (4) Goldman Sachs & Co. adds that Dell's
"increased size, larger international exposure, and much broader product line have reduced its
nimbleness." (6) These analysts and many others will be watching carefully to learn how Dell
and a number of other companies leap over such supply chain hurdles.
Having reviewed the extremely rapid evolution of complexity in Dell's supply chain and
products, one would be remiss not to offer a complementary view of the impact on supply chain
information systems, which are becoming an ever-more critical component of supply chain
success. Following is a brief note on Dell's efforts and difficulties in maintaining alignment
between its IT systems and an increasingly complex supply chain.
2.4 Note on Supply Chain IT Systems
In today's highly competitive environments, real-time information sharing and data analysis are
critical components of a successful supply chain. Dell recognizes this, and has taken many steps
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to remain on the leading edge. Brian Fugate and John Mentzer offer a glowing review of Dell's
success in developing supply chain IT systems:
"The company uses information technology to gather and share a constant stream of data on
supply and demand trends. On the supply side, Dell gathers real-time information about the
inventory levels of its suppliers at various positions in the supply chain. The suppliers are also
expected to share information such as capacity outlooks and new technology drivers. In return,
Dell provides direct signals of customer demand to suppliers and shares current and projected
market shifts and sourcing strategies. At the same time, the company's extranet-its dedicated
Internet link with outside partners-enhances collaboration on, and commitment to, forecasts.
This visibility up and down the supply chain allows Dell to manage demand in real time." (2)
Indeed, Dell has taken a lead in leveraging partnerships and information sharing throughout their
supply chain. However, the connections are not always as seamless as they are often portrayed.
One manager at Dell stated that, in some ways, Dell has been a victim of its own success. In
other words, Dell has grown so quickly that it can't keep up with the growth in some aspects of
the business. Information technology is certainly one of those aspects. Although Dell has
developed and purchased a number of real-time applications for supply chain collaboration, they
are many, varied, and sometimes unreliable as small or externally-developed applications
struggle to handle increasing volumes of information. In addition, much of the information in
these applications is heavily dependent on numerous email exchanges and Microsoft Excel
analyses. These factors present many challenges in the everyday compilation and utilization of
data at Dell, and improvements in this regard will likely provide productivity and efficiency
gains across the organization.
IT systems were only one of the many challenges that Dell's supply chain organization faced,
and over the past five years the technical challenges as described in this section have been
accompanied by similar growth in organizational complexity. The following section offers a
review of this organizational evolution.
2.5 Supply Chain Organization Evolution and Challenges
In 1998, the year that I have referenced as the beginning of a supply chain metamorphosis for
Dell, Dell's supply chain organization was fairly simple and was designed for efficiency in
working with local suppliers. (Note that, in this discussion, a treatment is not offered of all
supply chain organizational elements, but only those that are directly related to topics to be
reviewed in this document). In a similar form to the discussion of Dell's supply chain evolution,
I offer below a summary of the major changes that occurred in the past few years to make Dell's
supply chain organization much more complex, as well.
In the Beginning
In the beginning (1999), there were three groups in Dell's supply chain organization that
managed what has been termed "Continuity of Supply" (the process by which demand is
matched with supply). Those groups were Demand / Supply (focused on demand forecasting
processes), Buyers (responsible for supply purchasing and supplier relationships, and Production
Control (one group in each factory responsible for ensuring each factory has the supply it needs
on a daily basis). All of the groups were located in Austin and most suppliers were also located
nearby.
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US Supply Base and Buyers Move to Asia, RSM's Added
Over the course of 2000 to 2005, Dell's US supply base migrated to Asia. In 2002, Dell realized
that there would be significant advantages to also moving their US purchasing organization to
Asia. Dell quickly acted, opening new offices and hiring new (local) buyers in multiple Asian
countries. The buyers who had been located in Austin remained in Austin and either moved to
other groups or became what was termed as "RSM", or Regional Supply Manager. These RSMs
were to focus on a broader scope of supply issues, ensuring that there would be no problems over
a 13-week horizon for their given commodity.
Ops Cell, SC3 Added
By 2003, Dell had begun to realize that there would be a benefit to centralizing the management
of their manufacturing operations. Rather than maintaining a separate Production Control group
in each factory, these groups were consolidated in Austin and termed the "Ops Cell" (with
exception of a few liaison personnel who remained in each factory). This change was driven in
large part by complexities introduced with the new "GeoManufacturing" policies that were
previously discussed. Shortly after the introduction of the Ops Cell, a similar group was created
to handle logistical operations, called the "Supply Chain Command Center", or SC3.
This was a significant amount of change to undertake over only five years, and there were many
efforts ongoing to improve role definitions and organizational alignment when I arrived. It was
hoped that the Dynamic Replenishment project would be yet another step toward helping to
clarify roles in this complex organization.
In order to facilitate further discussion about the organization and roles that were affected by this
project, it will be helpful to review the basic groups, roles, and processes as they existed when
the project was initiated. For the purposes of this document, particular focus is needed on the
supply chain groups that were directly involved in day-to-day matching of supply with demand
to meet the needs of Dell's factories and merge centers. The discussion, therefore, may neglect
more strategic or unrelated supply chain groups in the interest of maintaining proper scope.
(Those groups include the groups responsible for long-term strategic supplier selection and
pricing, for example, as well as the groups which own the strategic configuration of Dell's
inbound and outbound logistics networks).
The groups that were relevant to this project were those that participate in cross-functional teams
called "commodity teams". Each commodity team is responsible for ensuring consistent supply
lines to meet demand for that commodity. The following diagram, with the exception of the SC3
organization, illustrates the roles that participate in these commodity teams. The SC3 role is
included because, although they do not participate on commodity teams, they play a critical
centralized function in the material balancing tasks of the commodity teams.
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Figure 9. The roles involved in Dell's supply chain commodity teams.
Below is a more detailed explanation of these roles and their responsibilities as of June, 2005.
Demand / Supply (D/S): A team, primarily organized by commodity, that is responsible for
understanding and forecasting weekly demand projections. Some particular responsibilities
include issuance of weekly demand projections and associated hedging, projections of lead time
extensions for customer delivery based on supply availability and other issues, tracking of large
orders, and planning for product transitions. A member of Demand / Supply will often be
referred to as a "Master Scheduler" (MS).
Production Control (PC): A team, primarily organized by commodity, that is responsible for
ensuring that all factories' supply needs are met on an hourly basis. Some particular
responsibilities include enacting product deviations (substitutions) or material transfers when a
factory may run short of a part, tracking factory needs and inventory levels for proactive
response, and communicating factory issues to other organizations so that proper actions may be
taken.
Buyer / Planners (BP): A team, primarily organized by commodity, that is responsible for
working directly with suppliers to issue POs for parts based on the weekly forecasts that are
issued by Demand / Supply. This team is located in Asia, with exception of the buyers for the
processor commodity team. Some particular responsibilities include the translation of part-level
demand forecasts into supplier-level forecasts (based on pre-negotiated supplier percentages,
called "TAM (Total Available Market) splits"), communication of supply needs (over a 13-week
period, on a weekly basis) to suppliers, and taking actions needed to ensure supply is routed to
the proper locations (e.g. material diversion or transfer requests en-route).
Regional Supply Managers (RSM): A team, primarily organized by commodity, that is
responsible for ensuring that supply needs are going to be met continuously over a rolling 13-
week period. Some particular responsibilities include a weekly industry report to all members of
the commodity team, continuous tracking of supplier schedules and issues to ensure supply will
meet demand over the next 13 weeks, and coverage for Buyer / Planners during Asian off-hours.
Supply Chain Command Center (SC3): A team that serves all commodities concurrently,
responsible for carefully tracking and reporting the status of "hot" incoming supply and initiating
corrective actions when immediate issues arise. Some particular responsibilities include the daily
tracking of a list of "hot" parts (parts at risk of going short), initiating and coordinating site-to-
site material transfers, and tracking key logistical metrics, such as daily backlog levels.
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Examples of other relevant supply chain groups and roles include GSM/GCMs (Global
Commodity/Supply Managers, responsible for longer term pricing and strategy issues), and
Logistics (responsible for managing the supply network), among others. These are examples of
roles that were relevant but not central to the Dynamic Replenishment project.
It is important to note that all of these groups and roles are primarily located in Austin, TX, with
exception of the Buyer / Planners. That team is dispersed throughout Asia, based on for which
suppliers a given Buyer / Planner is responsible.
As a visual reference, the following diagram offers an illustration of each group's position
regarding the management of supply in the chronological supply chain, beginning with the
forecast of supply needs from Asia (months ahead of production), and ending with production in
US factories.
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Figure 10. The role of various groups in Dell's chronological supply chain.
In order to understand the relationships between these roles, it will be helpful to review the
process that is at the core of their responsibilities: the weekly demand forecasting process.
Weekly Demand Forecasting Process
The Dynamic Replenishment project was one that focused on the day-to-day management of
inventory levels at Dell's various sites. In order to understand the steps that were taken as part of
this project, it is first necessary to understand Dell's general weekly demand forecasting/supply
management process. Below is a description of the weekly tasks performed by the groups
described above in order to match supply with demand.
* A new demand forecast is issued, reviewed and revised by the Demand / Supply team,
and sent electronically to the Buyer / Planners in Asia.
" PC reviews the new part-level forecast against current supply levels to ensure that all
factories will have the supply they need to meet their demand for the upcoming two
weeks. If tactical supply issues are encountered, the SC3 organization plays a key role in
executing the logistical changes needed to meet factory needs.
" Buyer / Planners review the part forecast plan for inconsistencies and communicate
potential problems back to the Demand / Supply team. Once issues are resolved, the
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Buyer / Planners break out the part forecasts into "TAM splits", or the percentage of each
part's demand that each supplier will provide based on contractual agreements. A report
of required demand by part is sent electronically to each supplier (with only that
supplier's data contained).
Suppliers review the GDS's that they have been sent to assure that they can make the
required production adjustments. Each supplier responds to the Buyer / Planner with a
set of stated "commits". These commits are the amounts of each product the supplier will
provide to each location, and the supplier becomes responsible for meeting these
commitments. RSMs work with suppliers where necessary to resolve any near-term
sourcing issues, especially for industry constrained parts.
* The Demand / Supply team consolidates the supplier-level commits back into part-level
commits, creating "Demand Supply" reports which compare supply commits to demand
at the part and site level for the upcoming weeks. They use these reports to determine if
any parts need to be put "on lead time", indicating that any customer order requiring that
part (given that there is no deviation for the part) will be delayed by a stated amount of
time.
Needless to say, many other routines and processes exist in Dell's supply chain
organization, but this particular process is the most relevant to matching supply with
demand, and therefore to the Dynamic Replenishment project. In fact, this process - and its
complications - are what drove the need for implementation of the Dynamic Replenishment
project. The following section offers an explanation of the challenges that Dell faces in
matching supply with demand at its increasingly dispersed factories and fulfillment
locations.
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3. Material Balancing at Dell
"Material Balancing" at Dell refers, in the most basic sense, to the ability to match incoming
supply with demand at each fulfillment location (factories and merge centers). To an employee at
Dell, there will be more specific connotations associated with the phrase. In Dell-speak, an
employee would be likely to describe material balancing as "the effort to maintain the same DSI
levels at all sites." This is because, at Dell, inventory levels are measured in units of DSI, or
"Days of Sales Inventory". This quantity is given by the inventory count of a part divided by the
daily forecasted sales for that part. For example, if Dell has 500 of Part A and average forecasted
demand over the upcoming week is 50/day, then it has 10 DSI of Part A.
Dell's maintains a consistent DSI goal for "standard" parts, where non-standard parts might
include a plastic connector that costs little to purchase and store at much higher levels than
standard parts. This goal is clearly communicated to suppliers, and suppliers are responsible for
ensuring that the SLCs continuously hold that minimum level of DSI for each of their parts. This
policy has served Dell well, although there are debatable aspects of its efficacy. For example, a
part that typically runs at extremely low volumes may go on severe shortage if a large order for it
is placed. Similarly, it is likely that the same DSI level is not the optimal inventory level for all
types of parts, and a number of Dell employees are working to enhance the metric to
accommodate this notion. However, it is not the focus of this project to question this policy, and
discussion will be advanced with the assumption that the policy will remain in place.
3.1 Material Balancing Challenges
At Dell, employees make things happen. That is to say that, when something goes wrong, a
culturally driven "can-do" attitude takes over. For example, if sales run low on a given item,
promotions are immediately put into place in order drive down stock levels and maintain market
share. Similarly, if a part runs low in the factory, little time will pass before a manager is on the
phone scheduling a transfer of material or a demand manager has modified website promotions
in order to re-direct customers to a similar part that is in stock (referred to as "demand shaping").
This attitude and way of doing business has served Dell extremely well and is likely to in the
future. However, this culture of immediate execution at all levels in Dell can sometimes mask
trends that exist as a result of underlying issues (since individual symptoms are resolved with
such expedience). That is what happened to Dell with material balancing.
For years, material balancing was not a problem for Dell, as it had only one location. In the past
five years, however, two new factories and a number of new merge centers have been
constructed in five different states. As these new locations began to be introduced, Dell's
employees quickly adapted to the need for material movement between sites. Site-to-site material
movements (typically referred to as transfers) became frequent and the ad-hoc re-routing of
incoming supply (or diversions) was not uncommon. When Dell had only two sites (Austin and
Nashville), this was not an insurmountable task. Even as Dell added new merge centers in Ohio
and Reno, employees coordinated well and ensured that material was always where it needed to
be (note that merge centers do not have as significant of an impact on material balancing
complexity since merge center orders are easier to shift from site to site than factory orders). By
2003, material balancing had become more challenging for Dell, but management lacked
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visibility to the issue as most of the problems were resolved quickly without escalation. This lack
of visibility to material balancing challenges changed around 2003, when a number of critical
parts became industry constrained. Inventory balancing problems for these commodities became
much more difficult to address as supply ran short and transfers became more complicated and
frequent. As a result, the material balancing problem at Dell eventually presented itself in three
forms: logistics costs, part shortages, and organizational complications.
3.2 The Material Balancing Problem: Logistics Costs
Dell tracks a number of indicators in order to monitor its total "cost per box", which serves as the
ultimate operations cost indicator. One key element of this cost is the quarterly amount of money
spent on transportation and logistics. Much of this logistics cost is steady, based on regular ocean
and air routes for routing shipments of parts. However, a larger and larger portion of it can be
attributed to a category called "expedites". An expedite occurs when, for any of various reasons,
parts are needed at a factory more rapidly than normal. This occurs, typically, when a factory
faces an imminent shortage of a part. Reasons for this may include low forecasts, large customer
orders, or sales promotions (often through Dell's well-known "demand-shaping" strategy),
among others. In fact, there are so many drivers behind the need for these expedites that Dell has
established an official categorization hierarchy for their cost buckets. The following chart and
explanation offers the detail of this hierarchy.
Isolated Causes Isolated vs. Recurring
Type
Geography
Commodity
Figure 11. The categorization hierarchy of various types of expedite costs at Dell.
Expedite Categorization Hierarchy
o Isolated vs. Recurring Causes: The purpose of this split is to identify the expedite drivers
over which Dell has little control. They call these "isolated causes". For example, if Dell
is forced to switch suppliers for some reason, they will likely suffer a shortage in parts
due to the rapid supplier transition. "Recurring Causes" is the bucket that includes factors
over which Dell does have more control and for which it should implement improved
processes. This bucket includes:
26
.... ..
o Expedite Type - This explains the true root cause of the expedite. For example a
part shortage may occur because of a material imbalance (one site is short on a
part while another has too much of the same part) or a quality issue (defect issues
on a part cause a shortage).
o Expedite Geography - This is simply a separation of US-based expedites (US
site-to-US site transfer) and world expedites (which may include air expedites
from Asia to the US or Europe to South America, for example).
o Expedited Commodity - This is the commodity category into which the expedited
part falls.
In the past few years, these types of cost have increased at a fast pace for Dell. A presentation
was given to Dell's management in the second quarter of 2006 that quoted expedite costs in the
tens of millions per quarter after having risen steadily for two years. The following is a chart of
Dell's quarterly expedite spend from Q4 of FY03 to Q2 of FY06, indicating a very rapid
increase.
Figure 12. Dell Americas Quarterly Expedite Spend Q4 FY03 - Q2 FY06.
After this information was presented to supply chain mangers in Q2 of Dell's FY06, a challenge
was issued to understand the drivers for these costs and bring them down. This marked the
beginning of the evolution of the expedite cost hierarchy and the efforts to bring down costs in
every category.
3.3 The Material Balancing Problem: Part Shortages
The second way in which the material balancing problem revealed itself was through increased
numbers of part shortages. Part shortages are a critical indicator for Dell, as the company prides
itself on customer service and on-time deliveries. Many part shortages will result in multiple
orders being placed on backorder, delaying customer deliveries. As Dell added more and more
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sites and products, demand disaggregation (as discussed in previous sections) led to more and
more shortages. Also, increasing world supply constraints of various PC parts complicated this
issue. Rough shortage estimates for the Americas Region revealed that shortages had increased
significantly in 2005. As a result, multiple site-to-site expedites were being performed every
week at significant cost.
These levels of shortages did not occur for all types of parts and commodities. The commodities
hit hardest by increased shortages were those whose industry capacity was constrained and
which were large and bulky to transport. These combined factors led to higher shortage
incidents, and higher costs required to "fix" the shortage through logistical expedites. I will refer
to the commodity that best met this profile as "Commodity 1". The entire industry for
Commodity 1 was capacity constrained, and it was expensive to transport due to size and weight.
These factors drove Commodity 1 to the head of the expedite cost driver list, along with
commodities that had similar characteristics. The following chart depicts contribution by
commodity to regional expedite costs for Dell that were attributed to the material balancing issue
in Q2 of 2005 (commodities are unidentified for purposes of confidentiality).
N Commodity 1
N Commodity 2
0 "Other"
o Commodity A
N Commodity B
* Commodity C
a Commodity D
N Commodity E
E Commodity F
N Commodity G
O Commodity H
* Commodity I
* Commodity J
* Commodity K
* Commodity L
* Commodity M
* Commodity N
0 Commodity 0
O Commodity P
Figure 13. Contribution, by commodity, to Dell's costs for regional expedites attributed to
material balancing problems in Q2 of 2005.
3.4 The Material Balancing Problem: Organizational Complications
Finally, the last way in which the material balancing problem manifested itself was through new
organizational complications. As is apparent in Figure 10, there are often up tofive organizations
that have a stake in managing material imbalances. Because this problem (material imbalances)
evolved so organically, each of these groups slowly took on various responsibilities for
managing the problem, with ad-hoc coordination amongst themselves as needed. Although
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Buyer / Planners were eventually assigned official responsibility for "campus balancing", it
proved challenging for them to coordinate and own the entire process.
3.4.1 Material Balancing Processes
Before discussing the complications that arose, it will be helpful to briefly describe the typical
steps involved in material balancing decisions. In Dell's extended global supply chain, there
exist two types of material balancing decisions:
1) decisions regarding immediate actions to transfer or expedite material, referred to as
transfers (site-to-site movement of material) or expedites (shipping material to its
destination by truck rather than rail in order to expedite its arrival) and
2) decisions regarding the final destination of ocean-shipped material that has not yet
reached a US port, referred to as a diversion.
The processes for these two decisions were somewhat independent of each other before the
project implementation. The following describes the basic steps and ownership in each process.
Material Balancing Process: Transfers and Expedites
1) Material imbalance is identified - This frequently occurred during a weekly commodity
team meeting (where the MS, RSM, and PC reps were typically present), but often
occurred randomly throughout the week as various team members recognized imminent
factory shortages in the course of their work.
2) Imbalance is communicated - The identifying group members sends an email to the
commodity team in order to advertise the shortage and find out if anyone has information
regarding the shortage (are there available part deviations? from where can we transfer
material?, etc.)
3) Ownership is determined - In an ad-hoc manner, ownership of executing the transfer or
diversion needed to address the imbalance is assigned to a group member. If the request is
urgent, the RSM would often take ownership, and if not, a request would be sent to the
BP to take care of the issue the next day (due to time zone delays).
4) Request is submitted - The owner of the issue submits an official on-line request that goes
to the Logistics group (which is part of SC3). A separate email must be sent to the
supplier who owns the inventory being transferred, because that supplier still owns the
inventory and a release must be obtained.
5) Request is clarified - For each transfer, a typical flurry of anywhere from five to fifteen
emails are exchanged between SC3, the supplier, and the commodity team in order to
address details of the request.
6) Transfer / Expedite is executed - Material is transferred or expedited.
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Material Balancing Process: Diversions
1) Needfor diversion is identified - Once a week, BPs bring together information on Dell's
current inventory status, incoming supply, and forecasted demand by part, and review it
with each supplier. They jointly decide which material should be assigned a new
destination in order to accommodate demand shifts that occur while that material is being
transported on the ocean.
2) Details are clarified - Where necessary, emails are exchanged in order to clarify the
information surrounding the diversion request, such as current inventory levels or
forecasted demand levels.
3) Diversion request is submitted to the supplier - The BP (or sometimes the RSM due to
time zone issues) sends an email to the supplier who owns the inventory to request a BOL
(Bill of Lading) change.
4) Diversion request is submitted to the carrier - The supplier sends a request to the ocean
carrier to ensure that it is not too late to execute the diversion (a BOL cannot be changed
once material is within 48 hours of its US port).
5) Diversion costs are communicated - Once carrier approval is received, the supplier seeks
approval from the BP for any additional costs incurred with the diversion.
6) Diversion costs are approved and diversion is executed - The BP approves the costs and
the BOL for the shipment is changed
3.4.2 Material Balancing Process Difficulties
As may already be apparent, a number of difficulties arose in the execution of these processes.
The following list outlines a few of the organizational complications that arose as material
balancing became a prominent issue.
BP Challenges: Buyer / Planners (BPs), in particular, faced two major difficulties in
executing responsibilities associated with material balancing:
o Time zone issues: BPs were unable to react to problems (usually part shortages)
that occurred during US daytime hours, which is when most problems were
found. These issues had to either 1) be addressed the next day upon sending an
email to the BP, or 2) be escalated to the RSM, who was the designated backup
for the BP.
o Proximity issues: Many transfer / expedite requests require close interaction with
Dell's SC3 organization in order to determine availability, timing, etc., as well as
to optimize the use of Dell's logistical resources. These communications were
very difficult for BPs, due to their distance from this group as well as time zone
differences. As a result, much important information was often not
communicated, or was misunderstood, resulting in inefficient logistical
operations for these transfers and expedites.
30
" Redundant Efforts: Since the commodity team recognized that BPs would often not
be able to resolve balancing issues quickly enough, many took responsibility
themselves for this task (as suits Dell's culture of immediate execution). This led to
redundant efforts being performed to track relevant information (demand forecast,
current inventories, and incoming supply) as well as, on occasion, redundant requests
being submitted for the same issue.
* Data misalignment: As team members concurrently evaluated inventory levels and
other related information - often from different sources - multiple discrepancies
would lead to drawn-out conversations (typically over email) to drive data resolution.
For example, any given team member had at their disposal at least three varying
sources for forecasted demand levels and even more sources to track current
inventory levels.
" Role misalignment: As RSMs spent more and more time covering for the BPs due to
time zone and proximity issues, much focus on core elements of their role was lost.
The RSM role had been designed as a strategic role, with commodity representatives
being responsible for understanding the three-month outlook for all sourcing for all
parts within their commodity. Executing day-to-day transfers and diversions for
material balancing did not make sense within this role definition, yet the RSM had
taken on a significant portion of these responsibilities. The same dilemma also
applied to the MS (Master Schedulers in Demand / Supply) role. They were
responsible for understanding demand, by part, for their commodity over a three-
month timeframe, among a number of other responsibilities. Execution of tactical
daily material balancing tasks often took away from the necessary demand
forecasting requirements of this role.
" Reactive processes: Proactive material balancing decisions were only made once per
week (once for diversions and once for transfers / expedites). As a result, if any major
demand or supply changes occurred throughout the course of the week (and they did
nearly every week), resulting balancing problems would not be identified until a part
shortage was imminent or had already occurred. This led to increased shortages, and
placed a significant strain on team members' time as they shifted to 'panic mode' in
order to address these problems.
" Communication delays: The exchange of multiple emails in order to validate details
often led to delays measured in days for actions that were needed within hours.
Before initiation of a project to help improve these processes, a survey was conducted in order to
understand and roughly quantify the organizational impacts of material balancing problems. This
survey was conducted by myself and the Dynamic Replenishment project co-manager. Questions
were submitted and responded to through a web service (Surveymonkey) typically used by Dell
to perform surveys. The survey was sent to all supply chain groups which are most involved in
material balancing processes: Production Control, Buyer / Planners (referred to in the survey as
China Procurement), SC3, Demand / Supply, RSMs (referred to in the survey as Regional
Procurement), the Ops Cell (which performs functions similar to those of Production Control),
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Logistics (in particular, those members of the Logistics team who were involved in coordinating
material balancing activities with Dell's primary ocean carrier), and Customer Experience (a
fulfillment group responsible for ensuring on-time customer deliveries). Both list-based
responses as well as full text responses were sought, depending on the nature of the question.
Appendix A shows the distribution of respondents from each group polled, in magnitude and
percentage of total possible respondents. The appendix also contains the results for two of the
survey questions, indicating that seven of the total 50 respondents spent 10+ hours per week on
material balancing issues, and "Clearer Role Definition" and "Designating Balancing
Ownership" were the top two improvements suggested to help improve the balancing process.
(Interestingly, these were ranked above the improvement of information systems, which was
initially anticipated to be the number one response).
Given the numerous material balancing challenges faced by Dell - rising expedite costs,
increasing part shortages, and organizational complications - it is not surprising that Dell's
supply chain management embarked on multiple efforts to decrease the instances of material
imbalances. These efforts included forecast improvement, part standardization, and re-
evaluations of inventory levels, among others. I was brought in amidst these efforts, to evaluate
and potentially execute a project to enable a more proactive process for the re-routing (through
diversions) of material and improve the tools used to do so.
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4. Proposed Solution: Proactive Material Balancing
The proposed project, which was already broadly defined upon my arrival, would re-route ocean-
shipped material, where needed, at the latest moment possible (which was 48 hours before
material arrived at a US port). This would effectively reduce the forecast lead time, albeit in a
restricted sense because the aggregate amount of supply could not be increased or decreased at
this late point in the supply chain. The following diagram illustrates this concept, which is that
what is typically a 60-day forecast would be reduced to a 14-day forecast by re-routing material,
as needed, when it arrives at the port (14 days is the maximum amount of time it takes to ship
material from the port to a Dell factory by rail).
Routing ecision
Point
Figure 14. The effects on forecast lead time of re-routing material as it arrives at the US port.
The potential cost savings from this proactive re-routing of material were undisputed. The cost to
proactively re-route a container was minimal (a nominal fee for changes to the bill of lading),
while the cost of a single truck for a site-to-site transfer would average 10 to 13 times the
diversion fee, and could range to 50 times the diversion cost depending on market conditions.
These transfer costs could become significant, as multiple trucks were often required for a single
part transfer (especially for larger parts).
Although this action was already occurring (performed by BPs and suppliers), it occurred by
exception and only once per week. This lack of frequency was driven by the fact that material
balancing decisions were regarded as ones that had to be made cooperatively by the buyer and
supplier. Given this requirement, buyers chose naturally to execute these decisions during their
weekly phone meetings with suppliers, rarely initiating proactive diversions throughout the rest
of the week. As a result, numerous opportunities for proactive balancing were slipping through
Dell's fingers as demand levels and other factors changed throughout the week. Also, the BPs
and suppliers had a tendency to use information that was three days to one week old, and would
base decisions on demand and inventory levels that had most likely changed. These problems, as
well as the complications illustrated in the previous section, drove a need for a more streamlined,
centralized, and proactive material balancing process.
The project designed to accomplish this had been termed "Dynamic Replenishment", indicating
that the routing of material to factories would become a dynamic process (whereas before few
changes were made to material destinations en-route). When I arrived at Dell, some preliminary
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work had already been done on the project, but a complete review of its potential had not yet
been conducted, and this is where I began.
4.1 Anticipated Project Benefits
Before embarking on this project, it was necessary to follow preliminary steps as outlined by
Dell's BPI (Business Process Improvement) process. This is a structured and monitored process
to be applied throughout the course of all major improvement projects at Dell, and has touted
success in the numbers of billions of dollars per year in cost savings. The process follows closely
in the footsteps of six-sigma processes, encouraging the use of structured problem solving
methods and thorough data analysis. With regard to this project, this meant that a key first step
would be to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in order to determine anticipated benefits against
which the success or failure of the project could be measured. These benefits were ultimately
stated in two categories: cost benefits and organizational benefits.
4.1.1 Cost Benefits
The ultimate goal of this project was simple: get material to the right place at the right time. This
would be accomplished by routing material at a later point in the supply chain - similar to the
idea of postponement of product differentiation. If successful, significant cost benefits were
anticipated from this project as a result of reduced part shortages, which would lead to reduced
logistical costs to transfer or expedite parts. In estimating potential savings, the first step would
be to determine how much money was currently being spent on these complications.
I was fortunate that, a year or so before my arrival, Dell's finance organization had just begun
tracking expedite and transfer costs more carefully. I therefore had a significant amount of data
upon which to draw. In evaluating this data, it became readily apparent that there was a
significant amount of expedite cost that this project would not impact. Since the project focused
on ocean shipments only, any air freight costs (which accounted for a significant portion of total
expedite cost) were out of scope. Also, any part shortage caused by anything other than a
material imbalance (e.g. quality issue, supplier issue) was beyond the project scope as well. Once
these expedite costs were factored out, it was determined that the total savings potential for
reduction of material imbalances was about 10% of Dell's total annual expedite costs. (Although
this percentage may at first seem trivial, it accounted for a significant amount of annual dollar
savings measured in millions.)
The 10% savings was the amount that could be saved if all material imbalances were eliminated.
However, the elimination of 100% of material imbalances would be impossible, as that would
reflect total elimination of forecast error. Therefore, the next step was to determine what portion
of the 10% could feasibly be saved through this project. A deductive approach was taken, by
assuming that there were certain factors in driving this cost that the project could not eliminate.
Those factors included:
* Demand variability: Demand variability is reasonably high for Dell, especially given
large orders that frequently come in from business customers. As a result, Dell's forecast
accuracy goals are often as broad as plus or minus 20-25% of actual demand. In order to
estimate this effect on material balancing, we estimated how often a diversion would be
"incorrect" (meaning a diversion was executed, but demand shifted in such a way, after
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the fact, that the diversion was not needed). Since no historical information on this had
been tracked, our experience-based estimate was approximately one in every five
diversions, or 20%. Therefore, the estimate of impact of demand variability was assumed
to be 20%.
* Supply variability: Supply lines for many of Dell's parts have a tendency to be
"chunky", arriving in large amounts at reasonably large intervals (1-2 weeks). This
reduces day-to-day flexibility in adjusting the routing of supply. The impact that supply
variability has, then, is to increase the magnitude of the impact of an incorrect diversion,
since longer intervals between shipments means larger shipments. In other words, it
amplifies the impact of demand variability. For example, a shipment (with a ten-day
delivery frequency) of 10,000 parts might be incorrectly diverted. If those parts had been
shipped in a more frequent interval of 1,000 parts per day, then it is likely that the
mistake would be caught before all of the parts were diverted. An assumption was made
that half of every incorrectly diverted shipment could be salvaged were it a daily
shipment. Since 1/5 of diversions were assumed to be incorrect (as noted above), then
the estimate of the impact of supply variability was 1/5 times 1/2 (the salvageable
amount of each incorrectly diverted shipment), or 10%. In the interest of a conservative
cost savings estimate, the estimate of impact of supply variability was also raised to
20%.
* Demand disaggregation: As previously discussed, the introduction of a new factory (in
North Carolina) would inevitably increase overall demand variability as a result of
demand disaggregation. The square root law of disaggregated demand indicates that, for
two factories, inventory levels must increase by F , or 41%. As Dell added a third
factory, the aggregate inventory impact would be -J-, or 73%, for an increase (over the
two factories that Dell already had) of 32%. Based on Formula 1 ( s = XL + ko ), we can
say that an increase in s of 32% should require an increase in safety stock (kaO).
However, since most parts that cause material balancing problems are industry
constrained, it is not possible to increase safety stock levels. As a result, the service level
is decreased by approximately 25%. Since a lower portion of Dell's demand would be
met out of the third factory than in the first and second factories, the estimate of service
level reduction was reduced to 10-20%. Again, in the interest of a conservative estimate
of cost savings, the out-of-scope impact of the addition of Dell's third factory was
assumed to be 20%.
These estimates are based on "back-of-the-envelope" calculations, and this was intentional.
Project managers were seeking an order-of-magnitude estimation of project benefits, and the
additional effort required to ensure high levels of accuracy would have been significant. Our idea
was that the estimate should be conservative, so that managers understood the minimum potential
benefit of the project. Given the conservative estimate (based on the above calculations) that
each out-of-scope impact accounted for 20% of material balancing costs, we estimated that
Dynamic Replenishment could reduce material balancing costs (the costs which represented 10%
of total expedite costs) by about 40%, presenting a quarterly savings opportunity of that
remained significant in terms of absolute dollars. (This estimation has as assumption built into it
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that the Dynamic Replenishment project would be applied to all commodities. This became a
topic of concern over the course of the project, and will be revisited in a later section.)
4.1.2 Organizational Benefits
The third, an much more difficult to quantify, benefit of the Dynamic Replenishment Project was
improvements to Dell's supply chain organization. As discussed in previous sections, Dell's
supply chain organization had become much more complex in recent years, and material
balancing processes in particular had become quite cumbersome. The organizational survey that
was conducted (Appendix A) underscored the need to clarify material balancing roles and
eliminate redundant efforts. In light of this, specific organizational objectives for the Dynamic
Replenishment project included:
" Clarify ownership of material balancing tasks.
" Document material balancing processes and identify opportunities for improvement.
* Reduce redundant material balancing efforts among commodity team members.
" Reduce the overall amount of collective time spent by commodity teams on material
balancing tasks.
" Improve and consolidate the information systems and tools needed for material balancing
tasks.
Although these benefits would prove highly difficult to quantify, there existed an argument that
their benefit should equal or surpass that of the cost savings. The reason for this was the current
state of some commodity teams in Dell's supply chain organization. A number of these teams,
especially those involved with industry-constrained commodities, found themselves shorthanded
in dealing with unremitting supply problems. Constant analyses, communications, and off-hours
meetings were required to ensure Dell always had the supply to meet its demand. These factors
were leading to problems such as high turnover rates and employee dissatisfaction. In this regard,
one may argue that the "soft" benefits of a project (clarifying roles, reducing time spent on tasks,
etc) may have a more significant impact on Dell's supply chain operations than cost reductions
in millions of dollars per year. Throughout the Dynamic Replenishment project, most managers
agreed that organizational benefits of the project carried at least as much weight as the monetary
benefits.
4.2 Project Proposal
Although the goals of the project had clearly been established, there remained the question of
how to accomplish those goals. The project team (myself, a project manager, and the commodity
team) faced questions such as: Who should own material balancing? Should responsibility for
material balancing lie with one person for all commodities? Does the answer lie in organizational
changes or changes to the current tools and resources? Over the course of a few months, the
team's answers to these questions evolved as we learned more about the material balancing
process. The following list reflects all of the options that were considered as solutions to the
material balancing problem.
1) A US-based owner designates routing for all material upon port arrival. This option
reflected a major shift in operations in that it suggested that BPs in Asia would no longer
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assign a US destination to material. All destinations would instead be assigned by a US-
based "Routing Analyst" as material arrived at the US port.
2) Asia-based BPs own material routing, with improved resources. This essentially reflects
what the status quo was (BPs owned material routing), but acknowledges the need for
enhanced tools and resources in order for the BPs to make better decisions. When
operating from "the other side of the world", real-time and accurate information resources
are critical to making the right judgments.
3) A US-based owner designates routing for material, by exception, upon port arrival. This
option is similar to Option 1, but is much less of a change since material would still leave
Asia with a US destination, and those destinations would simply be reviewed by the
routing analyst for necessary modifications depending on conditions when material
arrived in the US.
4) US-based commodity team members own material routing. This option maintains what
was the current practice of having one person on each commodity team own material
balancing, but transfers ownership from Asia to the US. The reasons behind this are time
zone alignment as well as proximity to critical logistics organizations for quick decision
making.
Initially, the preference was Option 1. Perhaps what Dell needed was to be forced to make a
routing decision for all material as it reached the port, so that none of it could possibly end up at
the wrong destination. However, we soon learned that there were logistical restrictions to this,
such as the requirement for BOLs to have a final destination upon departure from Asia and a per-
container fee for each BOL change. These costs would add up too quickly to make this a viable
option. The next option considered was an improvement in the information tools and resources
used by the team for material balancing. It seemed apparent that, if we could just get the right
information in the right hands at the right time, the material balancing decision would almost be
a trivial one. In researching this option, however, we quickly realized that Dell's IT resources
were far too constrained to achieve the goals we had in mind. Also, the more we talked with
commodity team members about the material balancing problem, the more we came to the
realization that this was first an organizational problem, then an IT problem. A sound foundation
of processes and clear roles was necessary before IT solutions could reach their full potential.
For these reasons, we chose not to focus on an IT-based solution. The final two options both had
a common appeal - the idea of US-based material balancing ownership. For the reasons outlined
in previous sections, we felt strongly that US-based ownership would alleviate cumbersome time
zone and communication issues that led to delays in urgent decisions. In deciding between the
two, the key factor became the idea that commodity teams could be freed of their time-
consuming material balancing tasks by having a single person (or group of people) take over this
responsibility. Also, Option 3 presented the opportunity to streamline the decision-making
process and apply new decision support tools to material balancing for all commodities, whereas
in the current state not much learning was shared among the commodity teams.
This analysis showed that option three was the strongest and most practical one. Therefore, our
proposal was to institute a new role in Dell's supply chain organization that would focus solely
37
on material routing and balancing in the US. Significant changes such as this, however, are
difficult to implement without a degree of validation through experimentation. Consensus was
easily reached that a small scale pilot of the new role was necessary to validate the benefits of
full implementation.
4.3 Pilot Plan
The following were the details of the pilot to be implemented and the reasons for those decisions.
* One commodity would be piloted. In order to maintain a small scale pilot that would
allow for in-depth learning, the pilot would only involve one commodity. As mentioned
previously, "Commodity 1" accounted for the largest percentage of material balancing
expedite spend, and so was the obvious choice for a pilot commodity.
e The routing analyst would be considered part of the SC3 organization. This is because
physical proximity to tactical logistics groups was critical to the tasks of a routing
analyst, who would be executing a number of re-routing and expedite activities on a daily
basis.
* Pilot duration would be three months. This amount of time allowed for the routing
analyst to become relatively proficient at the role and to have a tangible impact on
material balancing activities for at least a month.
The pilot would be conducted jointly by myself and a dedicated Dell employee named Julie
Summers. Julie was intended to assume the new role permanently if the role were determined to
be beneficial during the pilot. Appendix B illustrates the timeline for the entire project, including
the planned pilot.
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5. Pilot Execution and Results
Two major efforts were necessary in order to get the pilot underway. First, information critical to
material balancing tasks, such as demand forecasts, incoming supply, and inventory levels,
needed to be better consolidated to facilitate quicker decision-making. Second, a new weekly
material balancing process needed to be defined and agreed upon by the commodity team for the
piloted commodity.
5.1 Pilot Execution: Improving the Resources
Improvements to material balancing resources was a critical element to the success of the pilot.
Using the tools that existed before the pilot began, data consolidation to support material
balancing decisions took at least one and often two days. This would be unacceptable during a
pilot that required material balancing decisions to be made on a daily basis. This section will
offer a review of the improved material balancing model that was created. However, it is first
necessary to review the logic behind material balancing decision, so that the application of the
model may be easily understood.
5.1.1 The Material Balancing Decision at Dell
Material Balancing Actions
As reviewed in Section 3.4.1, there were three types of material routing actions which could be
taken to impact material balancing. The type of action taken was typically determined by the
point at which material resided in its shipment when the decision was made. The following is a
list of those actions in order of the most proactive (earliest in the shipment) to the most reactive
(latest in the shipment).
Diversion - Changing the destination of a container (or containers) while still on the
ocean. Specifics include the fact that, due to paperwork considerations, the redesignation
had to occur at least 48 hours before the container reached a US port. Also, only
containers that contained a single type of product could be re-routed. The cost of this
action was a minor per-transaction fee (where a single transaction may involve multiple
containers on the same ocean carrier).
Expedite - Expediting the transport of a container (or containers) from its US port arrival
to its final destination. This meant changing the mode of transportation from rail (the
default mode for all locations except Reno which always used trucks) to truck. The costs
of these transactions varied depending on the final destination. Expedites were also
required to be requested at least 48 hours before arrival at a US port. During the pilot, no
expedites were conducted and this type of transaction was not considered in the final
analysis.
Transfer - Site-to-site movement of material that occurs when inventory has become
unbalanced. If one site runs short on a part and another site has excess supply, the
material from the latter site will be transferred to the former. This type of transaction was
the most common type and was also very expensive (as previously mentioned, about 10 to
13 times the cost of a diversion for a single truck). Specific costs depended on the
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distance between the originating site and the receiving site (and other logistical factors
such as terrain, season, and truck availability). Cost was independent of whether or not
the load was partial or full, and did not vary with weight or piece count. As a result,
trucks for large parts were far more cost prohibitive than for smaller parts. Transfers
could occur at any time (assuming truck availability), and the shipment time from one site
to another averaged about three days.
The Material Balancing Decision
The material balancing decision was grounded in two, often opposing, objectives. The first (in
number and priority) was to avoid shortages of any parts at any factory, and the second was to
minimize logistical costs (shipment, transfers, expedites, etc). The prioritization of these goals
was driven by Dell's determination to always meet customer shipment expectations, which
meant avoiding part shortages at nearly any cost. As a result, our goals, in order of priority, were
to 1) initiate any transaction necessary to avoid part shortages and 2) drive the initiation of
cheaper, more proactive transactions (namely diversions) in place of the expensive site-to-site
transfers which had become the norm.
Since our mandate was to avoid shortages at nearly any cost, we did not make decisions based on
a trade-off of logistics costs vs. shortage costs (also, no reliable estimate of shortage costs had
been presented at Dell and we decided not to invest time in this given that we were to avoid
shortages regardless of the costs). The success of our decisions, then, would be gauged purely by
reduction of logistical costs and part shortages. We settled quickly into a decision routine that
accommodated these objectives, and the following is an outline of that decision algorithm (note
that a model called the "Material Balancing Tool" was used to support this process and will be
described in detail in the following section).
1) Review all parts, by site, for immediate shortages. Based on current inventory, scheduled
supply, and forecasted demand, if a part is anticipated to go short before its next shipment
arrives, then a site-to-site transfer will be required. For each transfer:
a. Research whether or not any deviations exist for the part that are not taken into
account in the balancing model. If a deviation exists, try to shift demand from the
part that is short to the deviatable part.
b. Verify all critical information - especially supply information. Often, available
parts would not show themselves in Dell's systems, and a significant amount of
manual intervention was necessary in order to confirm that the part was indeed
short.
c. Estimate how many pieces will be required to support demand at the site that is
going short until the next shipment arrives.
d. Determine which site has the most excess supply from which to pull. If more than
one site has excess supply, the decision may be made based on distance to the
receiving location in order to minimize time and costs.
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e. Determine how many trucks to ship and initiate the transfer through a web-based
logistics application.
f. Log the anticipated transfers in the material balancing model so that those plans
will be taken into account during step #2.
2) Review all parts, by site, forfuture shortages or imbalances (in which one factory is
anticipated to have significantly more inventory - in terms of DSI - than other factories
which use the part) that exist within the diversion timeframe. (This timeframe was
different for each site, since the travel time to each site from the US port was different.
For example, the diversion timeframe for Reno was nine+ days because a container was
assumed to spend about three days at the port and four days in transit - with an additional
two days because of the 48-hour pre-port notification requirement. Similarly, the
diversion timeframe to Austin and North Carolina were 15 days and to Tennessee 14
days. This meant that decisions to divert material from Austin, North Carolina, and
Tennessee had to made much farther in advance than a decision to divert material from
Reno.) This step was considered most critical during the pilot because these were the
actions that would proactively re-route material - at very minimal cost - before it arrived
at the wrong site and had to be transferred on expensive trucks. The following steps were
performed for each diversion:
a. Research possible part deviations (same as step a for the transfer process).
b. Verify all critical information (same as step b for the transfer process).
c. Estimate how many pieces are required to meet demand until the next shipment
arrives.
d. Determine if there is a shipment or shipments going to another factory which can
be re-routed based on that factory's diversion timeframe. If more than one site has
available supply to re-route, choose a site based on which shipment will arrive
sooner at the receiving site (this required verification of the scheduled port arrival
date through an online tracking application owned by Dell's carrier).
e. Determine the number of containers to be diverted. Ideally, an amount will be
diverted such that the originating and receiving factories' DSI levels are equal
(i.e. material "balancing"). However, given the supply line, this may or may not
be possible.
f. Request the diversion. This process took about a day and involved:
i. detailed verification of container numbers, quantities and scheduled arrival
dates
ii. sending an email to the supplier of the parts in order to obtain diversion
approval
iii. waiting for the supplier to send an official diversion request to the carrier
and receive a response
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iv. documentation of approval or rejection of the diversion request
These decisions could not have been made in any reasonable amount of time without an
interactive tool to facilitate them. This tool needed to consolidate demand, supply, and forecast
information for all parts by location. This information would be used to reveal daily DSI levels
for each site over a given timeframe (about six weeks). Given this information, a user would then
be able to input planned transfers and diversions such that shortages would be prevented and DSI
levels would be relatively balanced across all sites. I found such a model that was being used by
the pilot commodity team and enhanced it so that it took significantly less time to update and
was more user friendly. The following section details this model and how it was used during the
pilot.
5.1.2 A New Material Balancing Model
Since the team had agreed that this project was not to be an IT-intensive one, the solution to
bring together necessary information would be a simple, "homegrown" one. Steps were taken to
obtain consensus from the commodity team on single POR (Plan of Record) sources for each
type of information required. For example, one of the three+ demand forecast systems, called
MRP, was selected as the single source for demand information. This agreement drove
accountability to the respective owners of the information to ensure that the chosen source was
always correct. The agreement also (theoretically) eliminated the need to the routing analyst to
validate information against multiple sources. Once this agreement was obtained, I created an
Excel-based tool that would draw information from each chosen source and consolidate it in a
way that facilitated material balancing decisions. Below is a snapshot explanation of what was
eventually termed the "Balancing Tool".
Main 31-Dec 1-Jan 2-Jan 3-Jan 4-Jan 5-Ja, S-Jan
Part # Descri ion Sat Sun Mon Tue Ved Thu Fri
NOH 250 Demand from FSS 2.500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500
SLC 23000 Demand Adjustment
Yard Inv 7,500 AVL 25,478 25.478 25.478 22.978 20,478 17,978 15,478
B IL 300 O tions Ad'ustment
AVL 30.450 Deliver Trackin File
Opt 1 100 Deliver Adj. w? O t
Total AVL 30,450 Delivery Ad. (no Opt)
Late Su I 0 DELTA 25.478 25.470 22.978 20.479 17.978 15.478 12.970
Pending Transer(s): DSI 7.2 .2 5.2
.)
xxxxx
V Options 10V
Shortage
Tool
Comment:
Routing
Analayst
Comment
NOH
SLC
Yard Inv
BIL
AVL
Opt BL
Total AVL
Late Suooh
600
10000
18.000
16000
13.000
15.000
13,000
0
Demand (from FSSI
Demand Adjustment
AVL
Options Adjustment
Delivery (Tracking File)
Delivery Adi. (wl Opt)
Deliveru Adi. fno OWtI
DELTA
5,000 5.000 5,000 5.000 5.000
-1.838 -1.838 -1.838 -6.838 -11,838 -16,838 -21.838
-1.938 -1-839 -6.939 -11.839 -16.39 -21.031 -26.838
Pendin Transfer 5 : OSI
NOH 25 Demand from FSS 850 850 850 850 850
SLC 14,000 Demand Adjustment
Yard Inv 0 AVL 14.000 14.000 14.000 13,150 12.300 11,450 10,600
BIL 25 0 tions Adjustment
AVL 14.000 Deliver Trackin File
Opt 8L Deliver Ad'. wlOpt
Total AVL 14.000 Delivery Adj. (no Opt)
Late SuppIy 0 DELTA 14.000 14.00 13.150 12.300 11.450 10.600 9.750
Pending Transferfs5: IDSI
Figure 15. The "Balancing Tool" created to facilitate material balancing decisions during the
Dynamic Replenishment pilot.
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Model Illustration and Explanation
As previously stated, the primary objectives of this tool were to 1) facilitate quick identification
of potential shortages and imbalances and 2) to provide a platform for "what-if' scenarios such
that the user could enter information about planned transfers and diversions, and quickly
understand the potential outcomes. The below diagram illustrates the critical elements of the
tool.
Timeline - The first day is always the
present day. The top line indicates the
number of days from today, used to
quickly understand the number of days
until a shipment arrives.
Earliest expedite / diversion date
indicator. For example, in this case a
shipment may not be expedited to Texas
once its scheduled arrival dale is less I
that 4 days from today.
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Green: > 7.5 DSI
Yellow 2 to 7.5 DSI
Red: < 2 DSI
User entry rowsfor
'AU * *"~ planned Iransfers
and diversions
(highlighted yellow
. in this illustration -
not in the actual
model)
IEach color represents a different location (there were fou' in total). These colored areas alsoprovided space for comments so that the status of transfers and diversions could be noted. Duringthe pilot, there were a total of 20 parts to be managed at each of the four locations.
Figure 16. Critical elements of the material balancing model.
Use of the Model
In order to fully understand the daily use of this model, the best method is to illustrate both an
example of a required transfer as well as of a necessary diversion.
Transfer Example
The following snapshot of the Material Balancing Tool (with the present date being Dec. 13) is
an example of a situation in which a transfer is clearly warranted. Following is an explanation of
the reasoning and actions that would be taken to alleviate the situation.
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AVL 5.150 Deliver Trackin File 1300 6000
Opt8L 100 Deliver Ad lOpt)_
Total AVL 5.150 Deiveri Ad[ (no pt
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Tool BIL
Comment: AVL
Routing Opt 1
Analamst Total AVL
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700 dFr FSS 3.000 3,800 3.800 3.00 2,000 2,00U 2.000 2,000
13000 Demand Adjustment
30.000 AVI 27.700 23.900 24.600 20.800 17.000 17.000 17.000 15,000 18.000 20.500
16000 Otions Adotnmm
27,700 DelieyTracking File 4500 5000 4500
15,500 DjelivefAl.(WOpt)
27.700 Deliver Adi. [no Opt)
0 DELTA 23.900 24.00 29.0 17.00 17.00 17.000 15.666 W0.665 26.508 16.500
fiS1 6.3 6.5 6.6 4.6 .7.5
NOH 25 Deman (from FSF 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 800 00 800 800
SLC 8,000 Demand Adjustment
Yard Inv 0 AVL 8,000 6,900 7,100 6,000 4.900 4.900 4.900 4,100 3,300 2,500
BIL 25 OptiosA J
AVL 8,000 DeliveilTrackngF 1300
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Figure 17. A depiction of a situation requiring a transfer in the Material Balancing Tool.
Problem Identification and Alleviation
1) A likely part shortage is identified by the red DSI levels in Austin from Dec. 14 to Dec.
20. Austin will run short of the part starting on Dec. 16.
2) The routing analyst verifies that all inventory information is correct and no deviations
exist for this part.
3) The routing analyst determines what material balancing action to take:
a. Although there is a shipment of 4500 pieces to Nashville and also one of 1300 to
Reno on the way, these shipments are beyond their diversion timeframes (they
have passed the US port and are already on the rail, so cannot be diverted).
b. No parts are being shipped to Austin during the shortage timeframe, so an
expedite is not an option.
c. The remaining option is to transfer material from another factory that has
available supply.
4) The peak shortage amount (on Dec. 19) is forecasted to be 1,850 pieces, so that is the
minimum amount that should be transferred from another factory.
5) Nashville currently has 23,900 pieces of excess supply (from the "Delta" line) while
Reno only has 6,900. Also, during this time of year, trucks are highly difficult to schedule
out of Reno as weather conditions are bad and backhauls out of Reno are scarce.
Therefore, the transfer will be initiated out of Nashville. The transit time from Nashville
to Austin is about two days so the supply should arrive in time (by Dec. 16).
6) The routing analyst determines that the truck capacity for this part is 1500 per truck, so a
shipment of 3000 is scheduled (in excess of the required 1,850 pieces, but this is ok since
Nashville and Austin remain out of balance in the long term. On Dec. 22, Nashville will
have 9.3 DSI while Austin will have only 2.5, so it makes sense to fill out the two
truckloads in order to further balance the sites).
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7) The routing analyst logs the request in the Material Balancing Tool and submits an
official request to the logistics organization through an online application and monitors
its progress through direct communication and emails.
The following depicts the Material Balancing Tool after the routing analyst has logged the plans.
Refer to the "Delivery Adjustment" lines for Austin and Nashville, noting that a negative
inventory adjustment has been made to Nashville and a positive one to Austin (three days in the
future).
Flat Panel / CRT Material BalancingL'st update 12113W0510: 1AM
View SuDmlv Deteils NVTX T
hnclude Options? IYes
Dastoarrialatdestiation 0 1 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 1 6 17 1 8
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NOH 350 Demand From FSS 1.500 1500 1,500 1500 1.0 1.00 1.00 1.000
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Yard In 3.000 AVL 5,150 3,650 2.150 650 2,150 2.150 2.150 1150 1.450 6.450
BIL 200 Opin tsmt
AVL 5,150 Deliv[ Trackft Fie) 1300 6000
pt 8L 10 19O3000
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Figure 18. The Material Balancing Model after a required transfer has been logged.
As a result of the transfer, all sites are relatively balanced by Dec. 22, and the routing analyst has
reached her objective.
Diversion Example
The following snapshot of the Material Balancing Tool depicts the same model on the same day
as the previous transfer example. However, the routing analyst has moved on to reviewing a later
timeframe - the diversion timeframe for the same part. All transfers have been logged on the
earlier dates, so the forecasted inventory levels in this more distant timeframe should be correct.
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Figure 19. A depiction of a situation requiring a diversion in the Material Balancing Tool.
Problem Identification and Alleviation
1) A likely part shortage is identified by the red DSI levels in Reno from Dec. 27 to Jan. 2.
2) The routing analyst verifies that all inventory information is correct and no deviations
exist for this part.
3) In this timeframe, transfers are not a consideration. This is because transfers are a last-
minute option (within a five-day time horizon). Up until that point, the routing analyst
will either wait to see if demand levels shift or execute a diversion where possible. Also,
expedites will have no impact on the overall supply levels in this time horizon as they
only speed up the arrival of supply that is already coming. Therefore, only diversions are
considered when reviewing DSI levels in this timeframe.
4) The peak shortage amount (on Jan. 2) is forecasted to be 750 pieces, so that is the
minimum amount that should be diverted from another factory.
5) The best location from which to divert is Austin, since it has the most DSI and has a large
shipment (2300 pieces) arriving within its diversion timeframe (note that the red cells
above the time horizon indicate that the latest diversion point for supply en-route to
Nashville is 14 days from today, and for Austin and North Carolina, 15 days). However,
the routing analyst checks the arrival date of the Austin shipment (of 2300 pieces) in the
ocean carrier's database and finds that it is already at the US port and has passed the 48-
hour pre-port notification deadline. As a result, material must be routed from the
shipment of 1300 that is en-route to Nashville. The routing analyst verifies that this
material has not missed the notification deadline.
6) The routing analyst researches the supplier that owns the Nashville shipment and verifies
that it is a single container.
7) The routing analyst sends an email request to the supplier, who in turn sends a request to
the carrier for the diversion. Four hours later, the diversion is approved and is logged in
the Material Balancing Tool.
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The following depicts the Material Balancing Tool after the routing analyst has logged the plans.
Refer to the "Delivery Adjustment" lines for Nashville and Reno, noting that a negative
inventory adjustment has been made to Nashville and a positive one to Reno. Also note that the
delivery will arrive in Reno four days earlier because the delivery time from the US port to Reno
is four days shorter than that to Nashville.
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Figure 20. The Material Balancing Model after a required diversion has been logged.
As a result of the diversion, Reno will no longer run short. However, one may note that a second
potential diversion exists on Jan. 2 from Austin or Nashville to Reno. The routing analyst would
again follow a similar process to make the decision regarding this diversion.
The Decision Algorithm
Upon repeating these decisions multiple times per week, it became apparent that there was a flow
of logic behind them. One's thought, then, is that perhaps these types of decisions may one day
be automated. Dell's supply chain management did enquire about this, and the response is that it
is absolutely possible, but a stronger foundation of information will be required. In the processes
described above, only a brief bullet was dedicated to the "validation of information". However,
this step would often consume 50-80% of the time required to execute a single transfer or
diversion. Automation of these types of decisions will not be possible until all relevant
information is readily available. See section 6.1 for further discussion of informational
requirements, particularly as part of integrated IT systems.
Contemplation of this decision algorithm also leads one to consideration of the potential for the
optimization of material allocation to multiple locations. Although the Dynamic Replenishment
project was focused on implementation and organizational aspects of the problem, a discussion
of related research on this type of optimization will prove relevant. As Dell and other companies
conduct similar projects, research such as this should serve as the long term vision of what will
one day be possible given the right foundational systems. The following section offers a brief
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review of some of the literature that exists in this area and the gaps in assumptions that exist
between their respective theoretical situations and Dell's real-world situation.
5.1.3 Literature Review: Multi-Location Inventory Allocation
As discussed in Section 4, the fundamental effect of the Dynamic Replenishment Project was to
effectively postpone the geographical allocation of product to specific factories as it traveled
from Asia to the US. This concept is analogous to others in the inventory management arena,
such as the postponement of product differentiation. In management science literature, these
types of ideas are exchanged under terminological umbrellas such as inventory pooling or
inventory centralization. The basic idea behind this literature is that, when a product has long
lead times, high holding costs, and multiple final destinations, there are benefits to ordering in a
centralized manner rather than separately for each location. With regard to the Dynamic
Replenishment Project, this "centralized ordering" would be analogous to regularly ordering
parts for the entire Americas region without designation of final location until arrival at the US
port. The following is a brief review of key published works in this area as well as some
discussion of the differences between the literature assumptions and Dell's situation.
In 1981, Eppen and Schrage (12) published "Centralized Ordering Policies in a Multi-Warehouse
System with Lead Times and Random Demand". They discuss the idea of the introduction of a
"depot", which holds no inventory, but facilitates centralized ordering policies and postponement
of the designation of final destination. Given certain system parameters (such as lead times,
number of warehouses, and average demand) and costs (inventory holding costs, backorder
costs, and order cost), an optimized ordering policy can be determined such that costs are
minimized. These costs will be less in a system with an inventory depot because of inventory
"risk pooling". This is the idea that the random fluctuations of demand at each individual
location are, in total, higher than the aggregate fluctuation of the total demand (referred to by
Eppen and Schrage as "statistical economies of scale" ). This suggests that less buffer stock
(stock held in excess of forecasted demand in order to compensate for random fluctuations) is
required when inventory is ordered in aggregate rather than for each individual location. Note
that, since these fluctuations accumulate over time, this effect is amplified as a product's lead
time becomes longer. The idea of risk pooling is important to Dell for two reasons: 1) Dell's
product lead times have increased due to the migration of its supply base to Asia and 2)
Inventory holding costs are very high due to rapid obsolescence of parts in the electronics
industry. Inventory risk pooling will help Dell to mitigate the impact of demand fluctuations
throughout product lead times and reduce the amount of stock that must be held at risk of
obsolescence.
Although it is clear that the fundamental ideas presented by Eppen and Schrage are important
ones for Dell, there are a number of assumptions made which restrict the direct applicability of
those ideas to Dell's real-world situation. Those assumptions include:
* The "Allocation Assumption": An assumption that for every period an allocation (at the
depot) may be made such that the probability of running out at each warehouse is the
same as in the next period (16). (This assumption is a pervasive one throughout much of
the inventory pooling literature, and is most true in the case of low covariance of demand
and fewer numbers of warehouses.)
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* Demand is equal in all time periods.
* Demands for individual locations and between time periods are uncorrelated.
* Demand is normally distributed.
* Every location has the same inventory holding and backorder costs.
* A specific ordering policy (for example, order up to a certain amount each period) is
assumed.
* Demand is continuous.
* The time horizon is infinite.
Since the publishing of Eppen and Schrage's works, researchers have made progress in
eliminating some of these assumptions in search of a more realistic model for inventory ordering.
In 1984, Federgruen and Zipkin (13) published a model based on dynamic programming that
provided significantly more flexibility in assumptions than the Eppen and Schrage paper. The
principle of myopic allocation is used, suggesting that an optimal ordering solution is determined
one period at a time that will minimize costs in the next period without regard to costs in
subsequent periods (13). The broadened scope of the paper and more robust dynamic
programming solution allow for the relaxation of a number of Eppen and Schrage's assumptions,
including:
" Demand no longer need be assumed to be normally distributed.
" Holding and backorder costs may be different across locations.
" The time horizon may be finite.
* Ordering policy is not pre-determined, but rather arises according to "the actual nature of
the ordering costs" (13).
Further research has focused on alleviating specific assumptions, including that of Erkip,
Hausman, and Nahmias in 1990 (14), which allowed for demand correlations (both across
locations and between time periods), and that of Dogru, de Kok, and can Houtum in 2004 (15),
which allowed for discrete customer demand. (Note that these works did not build directly on the
work of Federgruen and Zipkin, meaning that some restrictions were put back in place in order to
relax others. For example, the work of Erkip, Hausman, and Nahmias was based on a specific
ordering policy - an order-up-to policy - even though Federgruen and Zipkin had relaxed the
assumption in their work.)
The work that has been done to make these theoretical models applicable to today's complex
situations has brought the world of academia one step closer to Dell's. The research has made
clear the fact that Dell can benefit from a centralized ordering policy by reducing stockouts,
holding costs, and obsolescence. However, the day when Dell may implement one of these
algorithms autonomously for routing decisions is not yet here. This is due to gaps between the
current model assumptions and Dell's reality, as well as the fact that Dell is not yet capable of
consistently providing the significant amounts of data needed to fuel such a model. Supposing
Dell were able to provide the necessary data, the following are some of the gaps that remain to
be closed in the creation of an applicable inventory ordering model for Dell:
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" The allocation assumption - This assumption will distort model outcomes as Dell adds
more locations and as covariance of demand increases. Both of these events are likely to
happen as Dell serves more customers and expands product portfolios.
* Site-to-site transfers - An applicable model will need to allow for these transfers.
" Expedites - Dell executes expedites, either from Asia to the US (by plane) or within the
US (by truck). An accurate model will have to take this into account.
* Ordering exceptions - In a fast industry such as Dell's, products are discontinued rapidly.
When products are discontinued, a large "last time buy" order is placed. This is one
example of an exception to the normal ordering process. Current ordering models would
not be able to accommodate these types of exceptions.
These are just a few examples of gaps that exist, as Dell's environment presents many
exceptional challenges which are not yet incorporated into academic literature. However, I do
not intend to suggest that the solution for Dell is to derive the "ultimate" ordering algorithm,
capable of handling every possible situation. The sophisticated solution for Dell will involve
understanding the implications of the collective research in this area and how various elements of
it can be put together in order to derive a proprietary and practical solution that will work
specifically for Dell. Models such as these also not only serve to help with periodic ordering
decisions, but provide a mechanism for sensitivity analysis. Dell might utilize them in order to
determine the cost impact of adding a new location or cost savings from lead time reductions, for
example. This is powerful research with powerful implications for companies like Dell, and
completion of the Dynamic Replenishment Project has the potential to serve as a stepping stone
toward achieving such optimal inventory policies. It is advisable that Dell remain alert to new
opportunities for gains of this nature as its business grows and evolves.
5.2 Pilot Execution: Improving the Processes
Recall that in Section Three, material balancing processes were described as two independent
processes: one for transfers and expedites and one for diversions. This was primarily because
transfers and expedites (which occur within days of identification) were typically identified by
US-based team members on an ad-hoc basis, whereas diversions (which require regular proactive
monitoring of supply that is weeks from delivery) were identified during a regularly scheduled
meeting between BPs and suppliers. There existed a critical flaw in this separation of
responsibility, since diversion decisions are highly dependent on transfer decisions. For example,
if a factory is projected to run short on a part within three days and remain short for an extended
period of time, a commodity team member will almost surely initiate a site-to-site transfer of
material and the BP will almost surely initiate a diversion request for supply that is traveling on
the ocean at the time. The result will be that the site that is currently short on the part will have a
massive excess of the part within a couple of weeks. This problem occurred twice through the
course of two months of the pilot, with one of the instances incurring costs to send the material
back to the site from which it was re-routed. In light of this, our first goal was to merge the
separate processes into one. The new process would reflect their dependence, requiring that all
transfer and expedite decisions be completed before and diversion decisions were made. This
ensured that fewer unnecessary diversions would occur.
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Based on this and other goals, the following became the new material balancing process.
New Material Balancing Process: Transfers, Expedites, and Diversions
1) All parts are reviewed for material imbalances - This occurs twice a week.
2) Transfers and expedites are initiated - Since ownership now lies clearly with the
routing analyst, transfers and expedites are immediately initiated.
3) All parts are reviewedfor potential diversions - Once all transfers and expedites have
been documented, the diversion decisions regarding the routing of material that is still
en-route on the ocean may be made. This was the most critical element of the pilot.
As discussed, the basic goal of the Dynamic Replenishment project was to establish a
more proactive process whereby material would be routed to the correct location at
the last possible moment, avoiding the high cost of site-to-site material transfers. The
key to the pilot was that Dell now had a role focused on these proactive measures,
whereas before, no single role was focused on this.
4) Transfer, expedite, and diversion decisions are communicated - All material routing
actions are documented electronically in a public location with regular status updates.
Appendix C illustrates a diagram of the material balancing process before and after the pilot,
highlighting the roles of each key participant. Much of the overlap in responsibility is eliminated
with the new process. Also, note that one of the roles - the RSM - is completely removed from
the process, which aligned well with management's desire to establish the RSM role as a more
strategic one.
5.3 Pilot Execution: Implementation and Experience
These improved tools and processes were implemented starting in mid-September 2005, with
preparation beginning in early September. First, complete buy-in on the new tools and processes
was obtained from the commodity team and all involved managers. (This step was made much
easier by the fact that the commodity team and all relevant managers had been included in the
project development process from the beginning.) Next, I conducted training sessions for those
who required them on the new tools, and I received intensive on-the-job training from the
commodity team on material balancing procedures. After about three weeks of working through
the new system and learning the new tools, the team settled into the new processes quite well.
However, the two-month duration of the pilot was by no means simple and the experience was
challenging and educating.
The Pilot Experience
Few company interns are offered the opportunity to perform a critical daily function within an
organization, let alone to perform one in the middle of one of the company's most critical
organizations (Logistics, in this case) for one of its most important commodities. The experience
is one for which I am highly grateful and will certainly leverage in the solution of any logistics
problem I encounter in the future. In order to provide some perspective to the reader as to the
nature of my pilot experience, I offer a bit of supplemental information about the daily tasks
which were involved in the pilot.
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Daily Life as a Routing Analyst
Often - at the beginning of the week - it was typical to find that a number of the demand
assumptions we had made the previous week had changed. Perhaps a large order had "dropped"
over the weekend, causing a particular site to run short on a part with little advance notice.
Perhaps demand levels had shifted dramatically because of a new website promotion. Whatever
the reason, the first task was to address those emergency issues which had arisen. This involved
rapid research of current inventory and supply information, and the initiation of any necessary
material transfers. Next, all information in the Material Balancing Tool would be updated in
preparation for the weekly material balancing review with the commodity team.
During the commodity team meeting, team members voiced their concerns regarding particular
parts and corrected information for which our assumptions were incorrect (typically demand
forecast information). This discussion resulted in a multitude of actions, all of which typically
required validation of information (demand, supply, inventory) for a set of parts and various
actions to be taken to alleviate the imbalanced material situations (e.g. transfers, part deviations).
After the commodity team meeting was conducted and resulting actions had been executed, more
emphasis would be placed on proactive diversions. These were the actions from which the
success of the pilot would be derived, and more and more focus was placed on them as we
became more proficient at managing the emergency situations. Project management tasks would
also be performed, such as progress reports and the weekly updating of success indicators (to be
reviewed in Section 5.4).
Throughout each week, as these tasks were performed, we carefully tracked information that
would ultimately tell us if we had been successful. The following section details those results as
well as the criteria against which they were compared.
5.4 Pilot Results
Before the pilot began, clear success criteria had been determined in order to facilitate a true
measurement of success. These pilot success indicators were directly linked to the goals for cost
savings and organizational benefits as outlined in Section Four. Upon completion of the pilot, it
was evaluated against these criteria. The following is a review of those criteria and the final
measured success according to those criteria.
Success Criteria
The following is a summary of specific goals that were to be met during the pilot in these areas:
" Reduction in spending on transfers and expedites in accordance with the project cost
savings estimates (as outlined in section 4.1.1). For the pilot, these savings would be
about 28% of the total anticipated project savings, since that is the amount of expedite
spend that was historically associated with the piloted commodity.
* Significant reduction in factory shortages of the piloted commodity. This goal was not
quantified, as there existed a number of exogenous factors which would increase or
decrease part shortages, and it proved highly difficult to attribute shortages to a direct
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cause. We hoped that, after the fact, we could deduct other known factors and attempt to
isolate shortage reductions that were attributable to the Dynamic Replenishment Project.
Organizational improvements, including clearer roles, improvement in work / life
balance, and elimination of redundant efforts. These results were to be measured through
interviews with the pilot commodity team members upon completion of the project.
The cost savings success indicators were tracked beginning in the third week of the pilot (after a
two week training period) and reported weekly to the team and managers. A bi-weekly report
was also sent to higher level managers indicating progress and potential roadblocks where those
managers could provide assistance. (Throughout the project, these frequent communications with
managers proved invaluable in removing roadblocks and building support).
Results
As is true of many project pilots, we faced a challenge in determining the true impact of our
actions amidst a number of exogenous factors. For example, the pilot was conducted during a
downturn in demand levels, meaning that part shortages would inherently decrease, regardless of
the actions we took. Also, a diversion mistake that had been made before the pilot began resulted
in significant material balancing spending during two weeks of the pilot, drastically reducing our
apparent success in lowering logistics costs. In order to separate the effects of these factors from
our project's effects, we tracked them carefully. A clear understanding of when demand
decreased could help us understand whether or not our project's improvements would be
confounded with that decrease (hopefully, they would occur at different times and be separable).
Also, we tracked the costs and reasons for every single site-to-site transfer that was executed
over the course of the pilot. In this manner, we could separate those transfers that were a result of
decisions over which we had no control (e.g. decisions that had been made before the pilot
began).
The following are some charts that were presented as part of a final project review, along with
brief explanations as to how the exogenous factors were mitigated.
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Logistics Cost Reduction
Estimated Cumulative Transfer Savir as a Result of Diversions
10/11 - 10/17 10/18 - 10/24 10/25 - 10/31 11/1 - 11/7 11/8- 11/14 11/15 - 11/21 11/22 - 11/28
Figure 21. Cumulative weekly estimated savings as a result of diversions executed during the
pilot.
Each time a diversion was conducted, an assumption was made that it was likely that a
corresponding site-to-site transfer had been avoided. For example, if 10 containers of a part were
diverted from Austin to Nashville (before arrival at the US port), and the cost to transfer a single
truckload of parts from Austin to Nashville would have been $1000 (note that this does not
reflect actual cost), then the total savings would be $10,000 (assuming trucks carry the same
amount of parts as ocean containers). It would not be prudent to assume that all diversions result
in transfer avoidance, so only a conservative 50% were assumed to have had this impact (based
on experience during the pilot, at least four of every five diversions did result in transfer
avoidance, so 50% was conservative relative to this estimate of 80%). Given these assumptions,
the pilot was well on track toward the cost savings goals that had been established.
Part Shortage Reduction
As previously mentioned, a decline in overall demand caused a reduction in part shortages for
most parts at Dell. However, this decline occurred long before the pilot began, suggesting that
the dramatic reduction indicated below (of 50%) was indeed due to actions taken during the
pilot. Below is a chart reflecting this improvement for the commodity that was piloted.
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Figure 22. Reduction in Commodity 1 shortage incidents after the start of the Dynamic
Replenishment pilot.
Organizational Improvements
Improvements to the organization were, for the most part, measured through interviews and
surveys. Sample questions which were asked during these interviews included:
" Do you believe that the routing analyst role should be kept?
" How has the addition of the routing analyst role improved or hindered your job?
" Do you believe that material balancing roles were clarified by the pilot?
Each member of the commodity team was asked these questions through both a survey and a 1:1
interview (it was found that answers on the written survey were too brief, so most information
was obtained from personal interviews).
This type of data collection may be regarded as subjective, but in this case significance is
established in the fact that the results were very resounding. Those most affected by the changes
- the pilot commodity team - praised the pilot for having freed hours of time and improved
material balancing processes. Specific comments received from the commodity team included
the following:
"I think the pilot has gone great!"
"We would always gap out before making a move, and often it would be the weekend or some other
bad timing."
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"[Since the pilot started], there has been supply where it's supposed to be when it's supposed to be
there."
"Material balancing roles are much clearer."
"Not as many diversions were happening [before the pilot]."
"I now have 10-15 additional hours per week to devote to other responsibilities."
Every team member agreed that they wanted the new role to remain and the new processes to
continue.
In addition to having achieved such broad consensus from multiple individuals in various
organizations, we were able to tangibly show that we had reduced the steps in the material
balancing process and that roles had been clarified (see Appendix C). Based on these
achievements, we felt that we had met our objectives for organizational improvement. However,
over the course of the pilot and more conversations with managers, we realized that there was
another organizational benefit to be reaped: not just organizational improvement, but
organizational alignment.
As explained in Section 3, prior to the pilot, ownership of material balancing was unclear. Again,
'official' responsibility lay with the BP, but that reality was highly difficult to achieve due to
time zone and proximity problems. Consequently, the responsibility was a distributed one across
the commodity teams. For some roles in a commodity team, significant ownership in material
balancing tasks made sense. For example, PC had a critical stake in knowing when a factory may
run short on a part and preventing that occurrence through transfers or diversions. Also, the SC3
team was an integral part of executing transfers and diversions, and so should play a critical role
in material balancing. The RSM and Master Scheduler roles, by contrast, had been designed as
strategic roles, and their frequent participation in material balancing tasks did not make sense.
This misalignment of responsibilities with roles was a direct result of a lack of centralized
responsibility for material balancing tasks. After the pilot, it became clear that this misalignment
had been eliminated. Responsibility for material balancing now lie specifically with the routing
analyst, who was now US-based and could deal immediately with material balancing problems.
The more strategic commodity team roles (the RSM, BP, and MS) now played support roles for
material balancing rather than direct ones. The following diagram illustrates this realignment that
occurred as a result of the pilot.
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All roles involved in tactical balancing RA assumes tactical responsibilities
Planning and Tactical lines are blurred R SM, Buyer, D/S enabled to focus on supportability
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Figure 23. Strategic and tactical alignment of commodity team roles before and after the pilot.
This unanticipated benefit of organizational alignment became an important one for the success
of the project. Group managers saw the potential to restructure the roles of their team members
in positive ways, allowing more time for the tasks that they viewed as important to their team's
success.
I was clear to us and our colleagues, having reviewed these pilot results in whole, that some or
all of the policies undertaken should be continued. We created a recommendation based on the
strengths of the pilot, and this recommendation was approved by Dell's manufacturing
management.
5.5 Final Recommendations
There were two major components to our final recommendation: 1) Continue the routing analyst
role, and 2) Expand the commodity scope gradually beyond the piloted commodity to include the
next biggest expedite cost contributors.
Routing Analyst Responsibilities
Most of the routing analyst responsibilities were continued as performed during the pilot, but
there was a realization that the role should be further leveraged. At the end of the pilot, BPs were
still responsible for the reporting of part shortages on a daily basis. This led to delayed reports
(due to time zone differences) and difficulties in clarifying the information. Dell's manufacturing
management had begun a recent push to have very clear POCs (points of contact) for
information. As a result, we decided to shift reporting responsibility to the routing analysts, who
were physically seated next to the rooms and offices where manufacturing managers made their
most critical decisions. This would add yet more weight to the new role as well as serve as 'free
advertising' for the improvements we had made (based on experience during the pilot that these
managers relied heavily on the routing analyst for assistance with resolving urgent material
balancing issues).
Commodity Scope Expansion
Due to the high level of manual data-tracking required for material balancing decisions, it was
clear that the routing analyst could not immediately take on all commodities. The transition
needed to be progressive, so that commodity teams would have time to learn the new processes,
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and the routing analyst would have time to learn the details of each new commodity. Also, new
routing analysts could be hired as needed during this progressive process.
In researching which commodities to take on next, an important realization was made: it was
unlikely that the routing analyst would ever take on all of the commodities, as the ROI on the
reduction of part shortages for most commodities was insignificant. The following diagram
illustrates the fact that, after the top three contributing commodities (with exclusion of those
categorized as "other"), the savings potential for each additional commodity becomes very small
- not enough to warrant the routing analyst taking on all of the parts in those commodities.
Commodity 1 - Clear ROI
Commodity 1 accovnts for ~-30% of expedite spend
Adding Commodities - Diminishing ROI
Adding a commodity reqvires significant additional
work and resovrces
0~orned4 P
Figure 24. Contribution, by commodity, to Dell's costs for regional expedites attributed to
material balancing problems in Q2 of 2005.
Upon this realization, we determined that a new commodity - to be referred to as "Commodity
2" - would be added to the routing analyst responsibilities next, and perhaps one or two other
commodities in the future. The rest of the commodities would only be added as improved IT
systems streamlined the material balancing processes to a degree that would automate a
significant portion of the process.
These recommendations were well-received and approved by Dell's manufacturing management
team. As of today - March of 2006 - work has begun with the Commodity 2 commodity team to
add their parts to the Dynamic Replenishment Process.
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6. Extension: Managing Rapid Supply Chain Growth
Throughout the course of this project, my awareness of "the bigger picture" grew as I came to
understand the sources of the problems that I was addressing. I ultimately realized that the
Dynamic Replenishment Project was a reaction to a single symptom of what was a much larger
challenge: growth.
Section Two outlined Dell's well-known goal to reach revenues of $80 billion within a few
years. This goal has roots in what has been Dell's overall strategy nearly since its inception:
build-to-order, high volumes, and low prices (6). One Wall Street Journal author points out that
"The plan has worked for 15 years... Now, some investors worry that the vaunted Dell effect is
turning against the company as it requires ever larger market-share gains for steady revenue
increases." (6) Another author, of the High-Tech Strategist newsletter, states that "Dell has
grown too large to fight the tides in the market... its push into television sets and digital-music
players is a contortion to maintain the growth rates they're promising Wall Street." (6) A number
of analysts (and even managers who were interviewed at Dell) point out that it is worrisome that
Dell has suffered slowing revenue growth in the face of a rebounding economy. Statements such
as these and the statements (see Section Two) regarding logistical difficulties due to rapid
expansion show evidence that Dell could be reaching a critical point in its growth. Dell's US,
Global, and product expansion in the past five years were previously unprecedented, and Dell
drives forward in this new environment with few analogous corporate guides to such explosive
growth.
Note that this section is not a direct extension of the Dynamic Replenishment Project. Rather, it
offers a supplemental view of the broader issues that drove the need for the project. I will share
some insights, obtained throughout the course of my work at Dell, on a few specific areas that
must be addressed by all companies in the course of rapid growth: development of IT systems,
standardization, and organizational development.
6.1 IT Development
The topic of IT development is already well-studied and its issues well-understood. Therefore, I
shall keep my insights succinct and focus primarily on more high level recommendations. In
order to understand Dell's IT position as it existed upon my arrival, one must first consider
Dell's culture. Specifically, consider the "just get it done" attitude that has, frankly, brought Dell
much of its success over the years. One Dell manager, Ray Archer (at the time, VP of Americas
Manufacturing Operations) was quoted in an article about "Dell's Supply Chain DNA" saying
that "Our DNA is our culture of execution." I could not agree more based on my experience at
Dell, and quickly realized that this culture had guided many aspects of Dell's IT development.
Dell did take many of the critical steps in constructing an essential IT foundation. Software
vendors were brought in to install material management systems, supplier collaboration
applications, and a number of related solutions. Throughout the course of this development,
however, the development of mature collaborative systems was hindered by a few factors. First,
Dell chose intentionally not to bring in an all-in-one solution, such as SAP, in order to
accommodate their culture of rapid execution. An application like SAP would be far too
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cumbersome and would hinder the spirit of Dell's improvisational "get the job done" culture. As
a result, most of the applications that were developed were independent of each other, presenting
a number of future IT complications in 'connecting' the information from such applications and
ensuring that their respective data were aligned. Second, many small applications were
developed by various organizations to meet their specific needs. Sometimes these solutions were
shared, and other times they were used by only one person or group. In many cases, major
processes became highly dependent on these one-off applications, and support for them often
became an issue once the original owner moved on from that particular position. Finally, in some
cases, a focus on front-end application development had left gaps in the backend applications
that support them.
Having witnessed the effects firsthand of making tactically focused IT decisions, I realized that
there is a natural order to the foundational needs for IT systems. In order to leverage the general
population's understanding of a similar well-known concept, I shall refer to this proposed set of
priorities as the "IT Hierarchy of Needs", i la Maslow and his well established psychological
"Hierarchy of Needs". Below is an illustration of the IT hierarchy.
Figure 25. A proposed "IT Hierarchy of Needs".
This hierarchy reflects the idea that, in order to construct mature IT systems, the first
consideration should be the business processes underlying those systems, then the basic
information needed in order to support those processes, then consistency in the platforms and
methods used to store and retrieve that foundational information, then finally the fully developed
solutions that will make use of the data in order to support the processes. I have no doubt that
many IT professionals would champ at the bit to explain why this hierarchy is oversimplified and
does not address the true nature of IT development. However, my intention is to employ this as a
way of thinking about the most fundamental elements of meeting informational needs as opposed
to asserting a generalized IT development strategy. Many large organizations find themselves
establishing IT solutions in reverse, from the top-down. Front-end solutions then struggle to link
disparate data sources and to even find the data needed to support them, and often drive the
redefinition of business processes to support the new application.
Many large organizations (especially those facing rapid growth) would benefit to give some
consideration to this hierarchy. Specific actions might include documenting critical business
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processes, systematically rewarding foundational and strategic IT development (not just quick-
ROI projects), and centralizing the development of front-end applications.
A Note on Supply Chain Visibility
Specific to supply chain IT systems, Dell faces one challenge that serves as a major hurdle to
designing mature systems: vendor-managed inventory (VMI). Dell's inventory is not owned by
Dell until it is pulled into one of its factories. Although this offers huge benefits to Dell's balance
sheet, it presents a nightmare in the realm of supply chain visibility. Dell receives hundreds of
thousands of parts every day from hundreds of suppliers. Each supplier owns the inventory en-
route to Dell, and retains ownership over not just the inventory, but also any information about
that inventory. Dell is generally able to obtain this information, but as a result of VMI, Dell must
work through a large carrier in order to attempt to consolidate inbound supply information from
all suppliers. This is not a simple task, and although Dell has made some major leaps in arriving
at the goal of 100% inbound supply visibility, a number of challenges still remain.
To companies facing a similar challenge, few easy solutions exist. I offer two suggestions. First,
ensure that information-sharing regarding inbound supply is an explicit part of initial contractual
agreements with suppliers. Second, consider carefully the role of your carrier. Dell has utilized
its carrier heavily in order to consolidate supply information, but is now dependent on that carrier
for essential information, placing the carrier in a position of power. Use of a carrier for
information consolidation may indeed be the best solution, as carriers have the resources
necessary to collect and consolidate supply information. However, the decision should be made
deliberately and steps should be taken to mitigate dependence on the carrier (e.g. develop
proprietary software that consolidates the information and use the carrier only to obtain access to
the data).
6.2 Standardization
As discussed in relation to the "IT Hierarchy", consistency is critical for the efficiency and
capitalization of IT systems. However, IT is not the only aspect of a company's operations that
may benefit from consistency, or standardization. Standardization may applied to many facets of
an organization, such as processes, roles, and communications.
The argument for increased standardization at Dell is similar to the argument for consistent IT
systems: Although Dell thrives on an improvisational culture, its large size and rapid growth may
drive the need for increased levels of standardization in order to increase agility. It may be
counterintuitive that increased standardization can improve flexibility. This would not be the
case for a small organization. However, as an organization expands in numbers and
geographically, the organization as a whole will gain agility from standardization, even though
individuals lose some of their flexibility. Take the example of product prioritization policies in
Dell's factories. If each factory is allowed to implement independent policies, the individual
implementation of those policies is likely to be relatively fast. However, should the company -
as a whole - decide to make a shift in the priorities of it products, each factory will react
differently and at different times, causing a delay in the reaction to market changes. Although
each factory is individually more agile, the company as a whole is slower due to limited
standardization. In this manner, the benefits of standardization become greater as a company
becomes larger and more complex.
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This may be the story of Dell's position today. In the past, Dell's flexible processes and
operations have served it well, but today's environment of rapid growth and increasing
complexity offer potential benefits to even minor increments of standardization. The following
graph reflects the idea that flexibility may improve with standardization for large companies
such as Dell, although it will decrease if standardization levels become too high.
Flexibility
Potential for
increased flexibility
with more
standardization
Standardization
Figure 26. Some companies may experience an increase in flexibility with higher levels of
standardization.
In recent years, Dell has indeed been taking steps toward higher levels of standardization - both
in specific organizations as well as globally. Depending on Dell's precise location on the above
flexibility curve, these efforts may help to drive increased flexibility in Dell's organization.
6.3 Organizational Structure and Incentives
Finally, it is inevitable that a company's organizational structure and incentives will need to
evolve as it grows and becomes more complex. There are a number of ways to deal with
organizational size and complexity, a few of which include:
* Cross-functional teams: As organizations become larger, cross-departmental
communication becomes more difficult. Cross-functional teams help to maintain these
critical links.
" Managerial cross-training: Encourage lateral movement in the ranks of management so
that the solutions presented by various teams will be the best solutions for the company,
not just for that manager's organization.
" Proliferation incentives: Especially in manufacturing companies which replicate
operations at multiple sites, incentives should be offered not just for improvements to
current processes, but also the proliferation of those processes to other sites. As
knowledge is shared operations will both improve and become more standardized.
These are only a few examples of actions a company might take organizationally as it becomes
larger. I offer a very short list because my intent is not to provide comprehensive instruction on
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organizational change for complexity, but simply to acknowledge organizational change as a
critical element of the initiatives that a growing company must consider.
My experience during the Dynamic Replenishment Project was that Dell has indeed taken on a
number of these change initiatives and is likely to progress with them in the future. The
organizational environment is a dynamic one, where roles and organizational structures are
continuously evaluated, and management is open to change. Cross-training is encouraged at Dell
at all levels, and I also noted that IT organizations had begun implementing incentives for the
global proliferation of new applications. These were all positive signs that Dell understands the
need for organizational change, and is striving to create the organization it needs to succeed in
the future.
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7. Conclusion
Dell's growth since its inception in 1984 has been nothing short of spectacular. The company
must be commended for its constant innovations in operations including VMI, demand-shaping,
cash-cycle leverage, and the mastery of build-to-order manufacturing. In recent years, however,
Dell's relentless pursuit of increasing market share has brought about geographic and product
expansion well beyond what was experienced before the start of the new century. This expansion
has carried Dell into a new and complicated supply chain environment also faced by many of its
competitors. Among a multitude of challenges introduced by this expansion is the challenge of
material balancing.
Global supply chains with longer lead times and expansions of manufacturing locations as well
as product portfolios have made it increasingly difficult to accurately forecast the final
destination of supply. This, in combination with industry-wide constraints of supply for certain
commodities, has led to increased part shortages at Dell as a result of material imbalances. The
problem of material balancing has become so expensive for Dell that a renewed focus on supply
routing is necessary. This focus should be obtained by retaining the newly instituted role in the
supply chain organization (the routing analyst) whose responsibility it is to ensure that supply is
routed to the correct location as it arrives at its US port from Asia. The continuation of this role
should lead to reduced part shortages, lower logistical costs, clearer process, and improved
organizational health and alignment.
The problem of material balancing is one of many that will be faced as a result of rapid growth at
Dell. Dell's seemingly unbounded growth rate has inflated market expectations and left the
company in the difficult position of continuing to meet those expectations in an ever more
complex environment. In order to continue meeting these expectations in the face of such
complexity, Dell must address related challenges, such as the development of improved IT
systems, higher levels of standardization, and the need for organizational evolution.
The future for Dell is likely to bring more of the same: increases in US and global locations,
increases in SKUs, and ever-more demanding customers. Ultimately, this means higher
complexity in the face of higher customer expectations. This future underscores the need for
continued focus on improving supply chain operations through process clarity, organizational
clarity, and improved IT infrastructure. Implementation of the Dynamic Replenishment Project
was a large and commendable step in this direction. Should Dell take the continued steps
necessary to succeed in an ever-more complicated supply chain environment, they will continue
to capitalize on the strengths they have so passionately and successfully developed.
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Appendix A Material Balancing Survey Responses
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Appendix B Dynamic Replenishment Project Timeline
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QI:
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